

EYES ONLY

Conversation between Mr. Carl Marcy, Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, and Mr. John M. Maury -- 19 June 1969

Marcy: Thought we had better check to make sure things are on the track--10:30 Monday, the Director and Secretary Laird.

Maury: That is what I understand. Do you have any guidelines as to what should be covered?

Marcy: It would be best to take the 20 questions and amend them as required--that is update them if they need updating. You know this was Laird's idea. We wanted to talk with the Director privately. We never told Laird that. When Senator Fulbright went to Laird, Laird said he wanted an executive session with the Director and was so insistent that Senator Fulbright felt he should go along with it. We are interested in having those 20 questions, that is the answers to the 20 questions, updated and anything else the Director might want to bring up. It will be in Room S-116 in the Capitol and will be the full Committee. -Another thing--for some weeks Life Magazine has had "Okie", who was Johnson's photographer in the White House, on their payroll, doing a series of behind-the-scenes photography--he wants to take pictures while an executive session is going on. We set up a session for him but he wants to be present when an important hearing is going on.

Maury: I'd have to check on that with the Director.

Marcy: Please do that--I can turn it off if you wish.

EYES ONLY

June 19, 1969

S 6776

ABM

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, there are obvious and disturbing similarities between the Safeguard anti-ballistic-missile system and its predecessor, the Sentinel.

The intelligence estimates on which the need for the Sentinel was justified were erroneous. The intelligence estimates used to justify the Safeguard, according to an article in the New York Times of June 18, are now disputed within the Government.

The cost estimates for the Sentinel escalated at a frightening pace. So too are the estimates on the Safeguard. From the \$6.6 billion figure of March, which did not include \$1.2 billion for nuclear warheads, the estimate, according to the New York Times of June 18, has increased to \$10.8 billion. The additional amount was acknowledged by Secretary Laird on May 22, in testimony before the House Appropriations Committee. He stated that the \$7.8 billion estimate did not include the \$500 million cost of extending the system to Alaska and Hawaii, nor did it include the \$2.5 billion cost of research, development, and testing of the systems components. It must be noted that the new \$10.8 billion estimate is preproduction. And as we are learning every day, preproduction estimates are very seldom accurate and never less than ultimate cost.

I ask unanimous consent that an article and a editorial from yesterday's New York Times be entered into the RECORD at this time.

I also ask unanimous consent that a compilation of editorials regarding the ABM controversy be entered into the RECORD at this time.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, June 18, 1969]

U.S. INTELLIGENCE DOUBTS SOVIET HAS FIRST-STRIKE GOAL—BUT JOINT BODY CONCLUDES MOSCOW DOES SEEK MORE THAN PARITY IN MISSILES

(By Peter Grose)

WASHINGTON, June 17.—The United States intelligence community has reportedly concluded that the Soviet Union is not now striving for the capability to launch a first-strike nuclear attack against this country but is probably seeking more than parity with the United States in missile strength.

At meetings last week of the United States Intelligence Board, which is presided over by the Director of Central Intelligence . . . civilian and service intelligence agencies are understood to have reached a consensus estimate of Soviet strategic strength for the coming two or three years.

Sent to the White House as the official judgment of the intelligence community, the detailed and secret survey seems bound to become embroiled in the current controversy over the opening of strategic arms talks with the Russians and the proposed deployment of an antiballistic-missile system.

The White House announced today that the National Security Council would meet tomorrow on arms policies. President Nixon is expected to disclose at a televised news conference at 7 o'clock Thursday night when and where the Administration proposes to open the new round of disarmament talks.

Meanwhile, in a related development, 40 Senators—only 11 short of a majority—joined together as co-sponsors of a resolu-

tion urging the President to seek agreement with the Soviet Union to halt testing of multiple-warhead missiles.

The signers included the Senate Democratic leader, Mike Mansfield of Montana, and the Democratic whip, Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts. Senator Edward W. Brooke, Republican of Massachusetts, was the chief author of the resolution, which was endorsed by a total of 27 Democrats and 11 Republicans.

SECURITY COUNCIL TO MEET

Critics of the Administration are fearful that Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird and Pentagon strategists have drowned out Secretary of State William P. Rogers and other potential restraining voices—including the Central Intelligence Agency—in pushing for a stern negotiation position and for costly defense programs by in the critics' view, exaggerating Soviet nuclear capabilities.

Among Congressional opponents of the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system, there is particular resentment at what they see as the Pentagon's highly selective, if not actually distorted, use of raw intelligence data to promote the pro-ABM position. The same resentment has been voiced privately by intelligence officials themselves.

It is in this context that the high-level consensus estimate of the entire intelligence community assumes special significance.

The United States Intelligence Board is a high-level coordinating group that meets weekly to correlate all the data available across the Government. Sitting on the board under Mr. Helm's chairmanship are representatives of the C.I.A.; the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency; the intelligence branches of the Army, Navy and Air Force; the State Department, the Atomic Energy Commission and the National Security Agency.

These agencies agreed last week that the Russians appear to be moving rapidly, more so than expected several years ago, to strengthen their nuclear forces as a deterrent and are probably striving for more than equality of missile strength with the United States.

DESIRE AND INTENTION

But, in the board's judgment, this drive falls short of an effort to achieve a "first-strike capability"—the capability to destroy enough United States missiles in a first strike to prevent this country from launching an effective retaliatory blow.

The "desire" ultimately to acquire such a capability may be present in some Soviet policy-making circles, the board concluded, but both the capability and the specific intention to achieve it were ruled out for the foreseeable future.

This conclusion was reportedly stated in the formal "national intelligence estimate" without any dissenting footnotes from any of the participating agencies.

Pentagon strategists have repeatedly cited the threat of a Soviet first-strike capability to justify the need for the Safeguard ABM System.

NOT A DIRECT CONTRADICTION

The intelligence community's estimate minimized this threat, though it is not in direct contradiction with the official Pentagon view; Mr. Laird's statements raised the possibility of a Soviet first-strike capability by the mid-1970's, a time beyond the two or three years covered in the intelligence community's estimate.

Preliminary assessments prepared by the C.I.A. and made available to Congressional committees were understood to have come down far harder in rebutting Mr. Laird's arguments about Soviet capabilities.

According to reliable sources, Mr. Helms, aware of the political controversy surrounding the estimates, softened some of the language of the final survey—without altering the basic conclusions—to avert an unneces-

sary confrontation between the C.I.A. and the Pentagon.

The bureaucratic ordeal of achieving a consensus position among various Government agencies has stirred Congressional interest in the reliability of top-level intelligence and the means by which raw data are analyzed.

In policy controversies, particularly on strategic arms questions, individual agencies' tentative or preliminary assessments are portrayed as the latest authoritative intelligence as they are passed around among participants in the debate.

The purpose of the United States Intelligence Board is to provide a high-level forum for the entire intelligence community to meet and try to achieve a nonpartisan consensus for the President.

Mr. Helms acts as the spokesman for the community and the C.I.A. in policy-making councils. Pentagon and State Department intelligence assessments can also be called to the President's attention independently by Mr. Laird, by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Earle G. Wheeler and by Mr. Rogers.

[From the New York Times, June 18, 1969]

THE COST OF ABM

Critics of antiballistic missile (ABM) deployment have now been confirmed by Defense Secretary Laird in their predictions that the so-called "thin" system would prove far more expensive, if built, than initial Pentagon figures indicated. Mr. Laird's latest figures, declassified from Congressional testimony, reveal that the antimissile system will cost \$10.8 billion, twice as much as originally claimed and almost as much as the price tag originally put on one of the "thick" ABM systems long under discussion.

The cost of the original "thin" Sentinel ABM system proposed by the Johnson Administration in September 1967 was said to be \$5.5 billion. The Nixon Administration's modified ABM system, Safeguard, was priced for Congress at \$6.6 billion in March. It shifted Sentinel sites from urban areas to presumably less expensive nonurban locations. But it added omnidirectional radar and close-in defense of Minuteman ICBM silos, increasing the number of antimissile missiles from 700 to a reported 900 or more.

In May, the Defense Department acknowledged under Congressional and press questioning that it had been understating the price of the proposed Safeguard system by \$1.2 billion by not including the Atomic Energy Commission's estimated bill for developing, producing and testing ABM nuclear warheads. The system's total cost then was put at \$7.8 billion.

But on May 22, in testimony before the House Appropriations Committee that now has been published, Secretary Laird acknowledged that these figures included neither the \$500-million cost of extending the Safeguard system to Alaska and Hawaii nor the \$2.5 billion cost of research, development and testing of the system's components.

The present \$10.8 billion total is still a preproduction estimate, of course. Most recent experience in procurement of complex new weapons systems is that actual production and construction costs usually exceed original estimates by substantial amounts, apart from the normal effects of inflation. In the end, it would not be surprising if the cost of a "thin" Safeguard defense proved to be substantially more than the heavy system under discussion during the Johnson Administration, which was priced by the Pentagon as purchasable for \$13 billion.

Within reason, of course, cost should not be the determining factor in weapons decisions that could affect the life or death of the nation. But this is precisely what is wrong with going ahead on Safeguard: it is not a life-or-death matter. Its utility and workability are challenged by many experts. Even advocates of the "thin" ABM system

June 19, 1969

involving defense, the search for relaxation of East-West tension, and the search for ways to control our environment.

But first let us look briefly at the past. Just twenty years ago, in May 1949, Winston Churchill spoke of the need for a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). At the time, Churchill was in the Opposition, just as he was when he made his "Sinews of Peace" speech in 1946 here in Fulton. He proclaimed:

"It is our plain duty to persevere steadfastly, irrespective of party feelings or national diversities, for only in this way have we good chances of securing that lasting world peace . . . on which our hearts are set."

That is still true today.

Some two years earlier, Congressman Richard Nixon was assigned to the special Herter Committee, the committee which laid the foundation for enactment of the historical Marshall Plan. Mr. Nixon has regarded his work on that Committee as the most important work he did during his years in Congress.

Twenty years later, President Nixon made it a very early order of business, in his new Administration, to visit Europe. His first stop was in Brussels, where he spoke to the North Atlantic Council. There the President restated his willingness to enter an era of negotiation with the Soviets and East Europeans, and he pledged full, deep and genuine consultation: a new spirit and process of cooperation within the Alliance. Some of our Allies in recent years have criticized the United States for failing to consult as fully as it might have. The President has made it clear that there will be no further grounds for such criticisms.

The President's two addresses to the North Atlantic Council—in Brussels in February and in Washington in April—were the first major policy addresses of his Presidency.

He reminded the Alliance in Washington: "Two decades ago, the men who founded NATO faced the truth of their times; as a result, the Western world prospers in freedom. We must follow their example by once again facing the truth—not of earlier times, but of our own . . ."

"NATO is needed; and the American commitment to NATO will remain in force and remain strong. We in America continue to consider Europe's security as our own."

As I see it, the people of this country have three clear interests in the Atlantic Alliance.

(1) Twice in this century America has been drawn into European wars. We are entitled to maintain a basic interest in preventing conflict in Western Europe, remote as that possibility is today. The great Churchill himself spoke in 1952 of " . . . the thousand-years' quarrel which has torn Europe to pieces . . ."

(2) The pursuit of a stable peace, not only with Moscow but also with the nations of Eastern Europe. Here the Atlantic Alliance must maintain cohesion and unity in approaching the difficult and potentially divisive issues affecting East-West relations.

(3) Development of closer and more effective relationships among the arts, the economies, and the technologies whose interdependence gives substance to our emerging common civilization.

Pursuit of peace depends above all on solid military security in the West, and our prospect for success in any arms limitation or force reduction negotiation depends directly on the adequacy of our joint security arrangements in the Atlantic Alliance.

Thus, we must preserve military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression; and if it does occur, we must be ready to join in the common defense.

To be realistic, we must recognize that the Alliance today has problems on this score.

Allies need to be strengthened through improvements which have been recognized as necessary, and which the Allies have agreed to undertake.

Let me make one thing clear: so long as the achievement of a European settlement remains a major piece of the unfinished business of our troubled world, the Atlantic Alliance must remain strong. President Nixon said recently:

"It is not enough to talk of flexible response, if at the same time we reduce our flexibility by cutting back on conventional forces."

With respect to the political processes of the Alliance, President Nixon said in Washington last month:

"It is not enough to talk of relaxing tension, unless we keep in mind that twenty years of tension were not caused by superficial misunderstanding. A change of mood is useful if it reflects some change of mind about political purpose. . . ."

He also said:

"It is not enough to talk of European security in the abstract; we must know the elements of insecurity and how to remove them."

The President has proposed a fundamental change for the Atlantic Alliance: a breakthrough to a new and deeper form of political consultation as a means of approaching these issues. Thus, in connection with the forthcoming strategic arms limitations talks with the Soviet Union, the President has pledged and asked for full, deep, and genuine and continuing Alliance consultation—for such talks will clearly involve not only our own security but also that of our allies.

The other major Alliance task for the future is the development of a framework to define community interests in our ecology—our total environment. As Admiral Rickover said last Wednesday, the problem of making wise future use of technology might be the paramount issue facing the people of all industrial democracies.

At the 1969 Washington Ministerial Session of the North Atlantic Council, the nations agreed:

"The members of the Alliance are conscious that they share common environmental problems which, unless squarely faced, could imperil the welfare and progress of their societies . . ."

There is much conventional wisdom about the problems of our environment and of our urban societies. Most of it tells us how difficult these problems are. A review of it shows how few are the solutions which we can be confident will really work, and how important it is that we find some way of exchanging views and ideas in an organized fashion designed to benefit those involved in formulating broad public policy on essentially internal problems. For instance, our own Defense Department, uninhibited by local regulations or traditions, has made significant advances in the design, construction and administration of hospitals on a "systems" basis. Studies might be made, similarly, of training and use of paramedical personnel; helicopter rescue service for accident victims; occupational and physical therapy; the movement of goods and people; heliport construction and operation; school construction; language teaching; and other education practices. This would stress the positive spinoff of defense efforts and could result in better mechanisms for transfer of the findings.

Other broad categories and headings suggest themselves for possible exploration within the entire Atlantic Alliance.

Environmental matters: urban planning, air and water pollution, urban and inter-urban transportation, conservation, leisure, the harnessing of technology, and the role of the private sector in all these fields.

Civil and social affairs: adapting Western institutions to the technological age; investi-

gating the potential role of the private sector (for example, extension by European governments of tax advantages to contributors to foundations and other organizations seeking to improve the "quality of life.")

Educational matters: stimulating non-military research and technology on an Atlantic basis; promoting equivalence of university entrance requirements and degrees to provide greater international academic mobility; updating and coordinating curricula to provide more meaningful conceptions of the past, present and future for future citizens of an interdependent world; plurinational Peace Corps-Vista-type projects; and modernization of educational theory and practice.

A 20-year old international alliance is in some ways like a middle-aged university professor: both tend to resist major changes in their life styles. There has been a certain amount of resistance to involving NATO, as such, in environmental problems. But support for this dimension for the Alliance is growing.

By focusing the attention of the Alliance on these problems we do not of course mean to imply that only the members of the Alliance need to confront them. We would expect that Alliance efforts would be closely related to efforts in other international bodies with different memberships. But we are convinced that the Atlantic Alliance, being composed of many of the most advanced industrial countries, can play a major role.

One of the most intriguing and effective aspects of the new Alliance initiative will be the bringing together of the most responsible and knowledgeable officials having broad responsibilities cutting across such fields as education, urban development, technology, and pollution control. We hope that these men and women can cut through bureaucratic undergrowth and bring about workable, pragmatic solutions to problems of our technological age. Within our own government, for example, the Departments of Labor, and of Housing—as well as Mr. Pat Moynihan, Assistant to the President for Urban Affairs—have all expressed interest in the new Alliance initiative.

The new shape of the Atlantic Alliance is not yet here. The strategic arms limitation talks have not begun, nor have negotiations on European problems. The key processes, however, are underway: the Alliance was consulted on the President's decision to change the Sentinel ABM system to the more defensive and appropriate Safeguard system, and there is widespread understanding and universal appreciation within the Alliance.

The intense concern over environmental challenges has not had time to take concrete form within the Alliance, notwithstanding extensive conversations and discussions at Brussels and in national capitals.

But, in fact, there will be a new Atlantic Alliance. The future will bring "steadfast perseverance"—to use Churchill's phrase—"steadfast perseverance" in the maintenance of our overall defense strength. It will bring a deepening of the process of political consultation. And, the future will bring better understanding and control of our technology and our environment.

For of course our age is an age of very great peril. The central questions we face in the future are the questions of man's survival in the face of his weapons technology and the effects of his industrial technology on his environment. If we do survive, it will be because we have learned how to consult each other with regard to our political problems, rather than hurl weapons at each other; and because we will have learned to control our industrial technology—to make our world fit for man.

June 19, 1969

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 6777

agree with the original proponent of Sentinel, former Defense Secretary McNamara, that it has only "marginal" value. The Pentagon's obviously unreliable and vastly escalating cost estimates—from \$6.8 to \$10.8 billion within about two months—make increasingly pertinent the question whether the possible marginal gain is worth the money, especially at a time when urgent civilian needs are going begging.

[From the St. Louis (Mo.) Post-Dispatch, Apr. 15, 1969]

CONTRADICTIONS OF SAFEGUARD

The case for deploying the Safeguard anti-missile system has developed so many contradictions that the Nixon Administration would be well advised to lay the project aside for extensive re-examination.

Quite possibly the Administration could browbeat Congress into reluctantly granting the funds. But Mr. Nixon would be unwise to exercise that power. To undertake such a fateful escalation of the arms race without a substantial consensus behind it would alienate a large and important segment of public opinion, especially in the intellectual community. To invoke the sheer political muscle of the Pentagon and its allies in behalf of a highly questionable and costly program would deepen the frustration many Americans feel over their seeming inability to influence the course of events.

Secretary Laird says we must deploy the ABM system in order to protect our land-based missiles from a first-strike attack by the Russians. At the same time, the Administration cites the Russians' mild reaction as evidence that our plans are not provocative. Here is one contradiction. If the Soviets are not bothered by our ABM, it must be for one of two reasons. Either they are convinced from their own experience that it will not work—a conclusion concurred in by many of our own scientists—or they are not actually basing their nuclear strategy upon the ability to destroy our "deterrent." Either way, the case for Safeguard is fatally weakened.

Consider another contradiction. Secretary Laird presents Safeguard as absolutely vital to our national security in the years ahead. But Secretary of State Rogers is willing to bargain the ABM away, so he says, within the next few months. The Administration cannot have it both ways. If our defenses would be stripped naked without ABM, then no treaty to abandon it is justified. If ABM can be put on the bargaining table at the arms talks, then it can be laid on the shelf before the arms talks begin.

Secretary Laird was quite right in recognizing that his whole case for ABM rested on the premise that the Russians, in his words, "are going for a first-strike capability." As the debate has developed, however, it has become progressively clearer that the premise is not a fact but an assumption—a questionable assumption which even the Administration is now backing away from.

Scientific studies for Senators by Ralph E. Lapp argue very strongly that even by the most generous estimate the Soviets cannot acquire the power to knock out all our land-based missiles, which are only one part of our nuclear arsenal. If the Soviets could by a miracle acquire that power, we would still have left for devastating retaliation all our bombers, all our Polaris-Poseidon submarines, all our vast array of nuclear weapons based in Western Europe. To assume that every one of these weapons in our catalogue of overkill could be destroyed in one fell swoop is to wander in the realm of fantasy.

The truth is that Mr. Laird does not know, and neither does anybody else, that the Russians "are going for a first-strike capability." The same weapons which he chooses to regard as offensive in character can with equal reason be regarded as de-

fensive, or "deterrent." Any huge nuclear force can be a first-strike force if it is targeted on the weapons of the other side. Our own enormous arsenal, which we claim is designed only for retaliation, may look like a first-strike force to somebody else.

What it all boils down to is that both superpowers possess far more nuclear weapons than they need to destroy each other, and neither, so long as sanity survives, can afford to use them. In these circumstances, no security will be gained by escalating the arms race another notch. Deploying Safeguard will not deter the Soviets from building more ICBMs; it is far likelier to have the opposite effect. We need to negotiate an end to the race instead of running it through one more round of escalation.

[From the St. Louis (Mo.) Post-Dispatch, May 8, 1969]

SAFEGUARD: COLLAPSE OF A CASE

The longer the ABM debate goes on, the clearer it becomes that the central issue is not one of strategic imperatives, but of allocation of resources.

The case against deploying the ABM has now been restated by a distinguished scientific panel in a report for Senator Edward M. Kennedy. The case for has been restated by two scientists and a former head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a report to the American Security Council, an organ of the military-industrial complex.

Both reports leave the argument pretty much where it was. The fundamental question remains whether, in the present state of world affairs, the arms race, and our domestic social crisis, it is wise or necessary to commit the nation to an expenditure of eight to 20 billion dollars for more nuclear weapons.

The evidence seems to us overwhelmingly on the negative side, and to be buttressed by the constantly shifting grounds on which the Nixon Administration defends its decision to deploy the Safeguard system.

Thus the Kennedy report cuts the ground under Secretary Laird's crucial premise that the ABM is essential because the Soviets are "going for a first-strike capability." It does this so effectively that John S. Foster Jr., the Pentagon's research chief, is compelled to acknowledge that the Soviets cannot really hope to knock out all our offensive missiles at one fell blow. Dr. Foster has had to think up a new rationale. He says the ABM is necessary to give a future President time to consider how he should respond to a nuclear attack; by "protecting" some of our land-based missiles, he says, the ABM would obviate the necessity of instant, automatic retaliation.

But while Dr. Foster is advancing this feeblest of all rationales, the President's security adviser, Henry Kissinger, is spreading the sophisticated word that Safeguard is not directed against the Russians at all, but against the Chinese, just as the Johnson Administration originally said. Nobody, however, suggests that the Chinese are likely to achieve a first-strike capability. And if they are going for a second-strike capability, which can be exercised only against cities, then why is the Safeguard system being deployed around missile bases instead of around cities, as Mr. Johnson originally planned?

The Nixon Administration's confused and contradictory explanations for Safeguard all lead to one conclusion, that the decision to deploy it did not in fact flow from authentic considerations of strategic security. The decision was a pragmatic and political one, designed to satisfy the military-industrial pressures for initiating a new weapons system while inventing a new rationale for it that would, so it was hoped, mollify the developing opposition to Sentinel. For Mr. Nixon, the decision was a holding action, reflecting his reluctance, in the first few days of his Administration, to deny the Pentagon and

its contractors what they had set their hearts on.

But there has to be a better reason than this for committing the nation to a vast increase in its nuclear overkill capacity at a time of grave internal crisis. The strategic case for Safeguard having collapsed, Congress should say what Mr. Nixon could not bring himself to say: No!

[From the St. Louis (Mo.) Post-Dispatch, May 7, 1969]

OH, YES, THE WARHEADS

Opponents of the antiballistic missile have been saying all along that, judging by past performance, the Pentagon's estimate of costs for the Safeguard system would very likely turn out to be an understatement. That judgment has been verified sooner than might have been expected.

The Pentagon now acknowledges, in response to press inquiries, that the cost figure it has been using in testimony before congressional committees—6.6 billion dollars—was wrong by some 1.2 billions. It turns out that Pentagon spokesmen conveniently neglected to include the cost of the warheads. That is something like pricing a Cadillac without the engine.

This, we confidently predict, is only the beginning. The Union of Concerned Scientists which sponsored the research stoppage at M.I.T. last month, estimates conservatively that the \$7 billion price tag on Safeguard "will more than double before completion." Which raises again a persistent question about the military establishment's techniques in selling arms expenditures to the public: When does simple misrepresentation become outright mendacity?

[From the New York Times, May 22, 1969]

ABM: THE CENTRAL ISSUE

The great debate over the Safeguard antiballistic missile (ABM) system has ranged far and wide, but the central issue facing the Congress has been unwittingly clarified by the Pentagon's research chief, Dr. John S. Foster.

Dr. Foster asserts that Phase I of the project—defense of two Minuteman sites against possible Soviet attack—must be authorized this year or it could be outstripped by the Soviet buildup of big offensive SS-9 intercontinental missiles. A one-year delay now in starting Safeguard's Phase I would mean a two-year delay later in completion of the system from 1974 to 1976. The system, Dr. Foster argues, will be needed by 1974 because the Soviet Union is adding to its 200 or more SS-9's at a rate of about 50 a year.

Dr. Foster is frank to admit that "we do not know just how effectively" SS-9 warheads could attack Minuteman silos since "we do not know precisely their accuracy." Further, "we do not know how many SS-9's the Soviets will finally build," Dr. Foster adds, and "perhaps the Soviets themselves haven't decided."

But, the Pentagon's research chief argues, Moscow by 1974 could deploy 420 SS-9's. Soviet technological skill could by then equip each missile with three independently-targeted 5-megaton warheads, a guidance system accurate to one-quarter mile, a failure rate of only 20 percent and a device to replace failures. In that event, the 1,260 SS-9 warheads would have a capability of destroying 950 of America's 1,000 Minuteman silos.

These estimates represent a sharp up-grading of Pentagon figures released only two months ago and many scientists outside the Government are skeptical about them. Moreover, they argue that the Soviet Union, to achieve a first-strike capability and avoid nuclear suicide, would also have to acquire the means to destroy the American Polaris and strategic bomber fleets at one blow.

But there is another and simpler reply to the Administration's case. It is that the easi-

S 6778

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

June 19, 1969

est and best way to head off a future Soviet threat to the Minuteman force would be to propose an immediate Soviet-American moratorium on deployment and testing of defensive and offensive strategic weapons.

If Moscow agreed, the Soviet SS-9 force would be frozen at less than 250 single-warhead missiles. Soviet development of MIRV warheads (multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles) and further deployment of antimissile missiles would be halted. Safeguard deployment, no longer urgent, could be deferred. American development of MIRV and the Poseidon and Minuteman III missiles to carry it—planned to penetrate the heavy ABM system it was thought Moscow was building—would no longer be needed.

A moratorium—urged recently by Senators Mansfield, Percy, Cooper and Brooke—would freeze the present Soviet-American nuclear balance, which provides mutual deterrence and security to both sides. This summer's projected strategic arms limitation talks would then seek agreement on a more formal system and, ultimately, arms reductions.

Could the Soviet Union be trusted not to evade a moratorium? No such trust would be needed. Reconnaissance satellites and other intelligence now enable both sides unilaterally to detect any evasions large enough to alter the nuclear balance.

Heading off the next round in the missile race is essentially a matter of halting deployment of ABM's and, even more important, MIRV's—which threaten to multiply nuclear delivery vehicles on both sides many times over. America's interest lies in talking the Soviet Union out of building these systems. It is best done by offering to forgo them for the United States, not by forcing a race that is more than likely to become irreversible than to strengthen the American bargaining position in negotiating a stand-down.

[From the St. Louis (Mo.) Review,
Apr. 4, 1969]

WHILE PRIORITIES WAIT—ABM ADDS TO ARMS PROLIFERATION (By Barbara Ward)

Clearly, of all the things the Americans and the Russians could do together, or on parallel lines, to keep the planet safe for its human inhabitants, the most urgent and the most immediate is to avoid another upward twist in the arms spiral.

An ABM shield, beginning at \$5 billion and rising to who knows what cost, is only part of the issue, the sharp tip of the iceberg above the diplomatic waters. The iceberg itself is the \$120 billion a year spent by the Powers on their armaments. It is right to stop the further speeding up of the arms race which a new set of automatic, nuclear counter-missiles would set in motion. But it is even more urgent to begin going into reverse, to begin reducing the vast, unseemly burden of destruction carried by both sides.

Under Article VI of the Anti-Proliferation Treaty, both Great Powers bind themselves to take significant steps to limit their own arms. But the clause may simply be the rhetoric of a bargain between two giants who are chiefly concerned with keeping other peoples' weapons under control. Neither side has said much about actual reductions—by percentages of war budgets, by types of weapon, by matching withdrawals. Until they do, the hideous bulk of \$120 billion worth of weapons will go on throwing a cold and ugly shadow across the nations' collective life.

The horror of this vast hemorrhage of resources is not only the obvious ones—the risk of atomic miscalculation, the escalatory risk, or, again, the sheer, inexcusable waste of so much potential wealth when children go hungry. The fact is, on any calculation of Atlantic national income, over the next decade, the Western arms burden can be said to be quite tolerable in financial terms.

As this column has pointed out before, Atlantic wealth is growing by at least \$60 billion a year. A couple of years' increment could cover the Atlantic arms budget completely. Extend the calculation to 1980, and the extra income each year—on top of the present annual combined national income of rising \$20,000 billion—would be at least \$600 billion a year. Out of an addition on this scale, any conceivable arms budget could be carried without disrupting a single other desirable use of income.

But it is precisely at this point that some of the deeper evils of our arms race become apparent. We do not extend to any other vast social pursuit the largely unthinking acceptance we give to the concept of defense. We seem unaware—and our leaders do not enlighten us—of the future resources we shall have available and how many blessed and useful things we could do with them—rebuilding cities, for instance, or educating the drop outs and the handicapped, unpolluting our stricken atmosphere, giving every elderly citizen an income which permits a quiet old age and a dignified death.

But with our mental block about virtually every large public expenditure except defense, we say: "How can we rebuild the ghetto when we have such an arms budget?" We do not say: "Next year, we shall have \$60 billions in new resources. How should they be spent?"

At best we say: "With all this defense spending, we can only afford to help the poor at home. The poor abroad must look after themselves." We do not say: "Twice over-kill is as good as four times over-kill. Let us cut away \$20 billion, add in next year's resources, double foreign aid, treble the new cities program, quadruple housing—and still come out with a bonus for ourselves."

In short, if we felt about any great human undertaking—education, urban renewal, health, anti-pollution—the instinctive acceptance we give to defense-spending, we would scale down the arms, transfer the resultant saving to life-giving projects and throw in a proportion of the resources which will be provided by future growth. We would demand from our leaders some "budget" of priorities for the Seventies, some sense of how and where so much rising wealth ought to be spent.

Until we make some such calculus, it is not surprising that so many young people around the world find our society grotesquely ugly. This vast apparatus of wealth, used so acceptingly for destruction, so grudgingly for the great creative purposes of society, finally seems to them unworthy and despicable. The clutter of consumption, the high-velocity advertising, the shining glass office buildings and, alongside, the rat-infested tenements—is all this, they ask, so worth defending that billions on arms are almost taken for granted? Give us instead a picture of true wealth. Give us something we can fully respect. But money and weapons, piled up without compassion and justice, command neither our loyalty nor our love.

[From Long Island Newsday, May 1, 1969]

NIXON'S ALBATROSS

The ugly thing hanging around the neck of the Nixon administration only looks like an albatross. It is really a Safeguard antiballistic missile.

The President has received generally high marks for the openness and honesty with which he has started his administration. But this generalization cannot be applied to the campaign being waged for the missile system. Already, Nixon's reputation has suffered enormously among scientists because of misrepresentations about Safeguard and his veto of a director for the National Science Foundation because he opposed Safeguard.

Under Secretary of Defense David Packard

claimed that Dr. W. K. H. Panofsky had reviewed and endorsed Safeguard. Dr. Panofsky, a renowned radar expert, responded irately that his "review" took place after he happened to run into Packard at an airport—and that he opposed Safeguard.

The Pentagon told Senate inquirers that 21 members of the President's Science Advisory Committee had reviewed Sentinel with the Defense Department's research chief. It turned out that the review took place March 17 and 18—the week after President Nixon had announced his decision to proceed with the missile system in modified form. Some of the most influential members of this committee oppose Safeguard and resent being used in a public relations ploy designed to support it.

All this maneuvering and misrepresentation is a good example of how easily an argument for a bad cause is corrupted into a bad argument. Safeguard is a bad idea, for many reasons, and most independent scientists appear to oppose it. Nixon administration tactics are widening and intensifying hostility to the system—and to Nixon—within the scientific community.

Meanwhile, politicians from both parties and opinion makers of assorted ideological hue are seconding and amplifying the dissent of the scientists. The Nixon administration has responded by getting tough. A White House aide is quoted in the New York Times as promising that "all the conventional and proper, the unconventional and improper means of persuasion will be used" to sell Safeguard to Congress.

Roger C. B. Morton, the new Republican national chairman, has threatened to make Safeguard a test of Republican orthodoxy and opposition to it a mark of shame on Democrats and Republicans alike.

Sen. Strom Thurmond, Nixon's Southern outrider, has branded as "defeatist" objections to the missile by Dr. Herbert York, Pentagon research chief in the Eisenhower administration.

Gerald Ford, the House Republican leader, has accused Safeguard's foes of really seeking unilateral disarmament.

Like poison gas, the sinister implication is being spread that Safeguard's foes are moved by a deficiency of patriotism. Scientists who show this lie up for what it is are being cynically used, and misrepresented. This is not, we imagine, the way the President wanted the Safeguard debate to go. But that is the way it is going, as the President's men are pushed toward extremism and cynical manipulation by the faultiness of the case available for their missile.

It is too late now for Nixon to cast off without embarrassment the missile that looks like an albatross. But Safeguard remains a mistake—a dubious and expensive venture that may or may not work if it is ever needed, and that will escalate the arms race in either case. Continuation of Safeguard is bad for the President, bad for the country and bad for a world already grotesquely oversupplied with nuclear weapons. Nixon should stop it, even at the cost of some embarrassment. Continuing with it promises to be a great deal more embarrassing in the months ahead, and in the history books.

[From the Portsmouth (Ohio) Times,
Mar. 25, 1969]

NOW A SUPERMISSILE GAP

The American people have survived two crisis "gaps." President Kennedy's missile gap and President Nixon's security gap were quietly filed away after their campaigns ended, but now we have a new gap.

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird has alerted the Senate Armed Services Committee about a supermissile gap.

Speaking in behalf of deployment of the antiballistic-missile (ABM) program sought by President Nixon, Laird said the Russians are continuing to build up its SS-9 force.

June 19, 1969

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 6779

The SS-9 (Supermissile) is described as a missile with a 20 to 25-megaton warhead—much larger than anything the United States has at the ready.

Secretary Laird said the ABM protection offered American missiles would have the desired effect on the Soviet Union of letting them know a "substantial number" of our missiles would survive any attack "and then destroy the attacker as a modern society."

David Packard, deputy secretary of defense, added that the ABM would be "a stabilizing influence in the long term" in the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

That's strictly a pipedream. And so long as military thinking dominates a nation's foreign policy, money is going to be poured into the bottomless defense well while that country caves in from domestic malnutrition.

The thin ABM around missile sites will expand into a thick shield. Then it will creep around population centers, first as a thin system and then a thick one.

All the while the missile arsenal is growing—just to keep pace—and \$100 billion is gone. And there still will be no security.

It is up to the politicians in both America and Russia to override militaristic thinking and reach a meaningful rapprochement.

It isn't the supermissile gap we're worried about, it's the diplomacy gap.

[From the Roanoke (Va.) Times, Apr. 5, 1969]

GLORIOUS . . . OR PURPOSELESS?

The Army's chief scientist says a multi-warhead ABM is one of the "glorious goals of the future."

So is an end to the arms race, General.

Now if Gen. Austin Betts would care to try to convince us that only Washington, not Moscow, dreams of building a multiple warhead interceptor, possibly we could all better understand just what it is that the ABM race is going to accomplish. For if each side simply cancels out the other, as inevitably happens in a nuclear arms race, it is time that we stopped the whole silly ABM business.

Oh, we know—Defense Sec. Melvin Laird has suddenly discovered that the Soviets are building a new offensive missile that someday might be available in such massive numbers that the U.S. could be destroyed in a preemptive attack. But nobody has explained how Laird can forecast the Soviets' missile-construction timetables of a decade hence, or why such an interpretation of Soviet intentions was not made by civilian Pentagon leaders in the Johnson Administration, or why the Pentagon suddenly thinks bomber- and submarine-carried ICBMs would not still provide the needed second-strike deterrent.

Each day, it sometimes seems, brings a new explanation for ABM deployment. When the latest explanation is punctured, a revised rationale is always at the ready. In judging Soviet and Red Chinese intentions, the Pentagon assumes the worse—as it's paid to do. But in judging whether or not scientists can ever build nuclear-tipped defensive missiles that will actually intercept incoming missiles with pinpoint accuracy and with only a 15-minute warning, the Pentagon assumes the best—as it did with Vietnam, the Bay of Pigs, the F-111, ad infinitum.

Few scientists outside the Pentagon think the ABM will work, even against a stray missile accidentally fired by the Soviets or the dozen or so ICBMs that Red China might lob at us in the mid- or late-Seventies (when, we are supposed to believe, they would willingly invite instant annihilation of their own country in return for attacks by crude first-generation missiles that might or might not hit the handful of cities at which they were aimed).

If the Soviets think they can build a first-strike missile system, the Nixon Administration's modified ABM program—limited to a dozen offensive missile sites—will not cause them to shift course. Even if Moscow conceivably could someday develop a missile system that had the potential for simultaneously destroying all 1,000-plus land-based ICBMs and 646 Polaris- and bomber-carried ICBMs—and not even a Dr. Strangelove has yet figured a way to develop such a war machine—it is absurd to think that the U.S. would sit idly by and not redesign, expand and further diversify its own offensive missile system to counteract the whole thing.

The U.S. has 1,700 ICBMs, the Soviets only 1,100, based on latest available estimates. According to Deputy Defense Sec. David Packard, the Russians possess some 200 of their new super-missiles, the SS-9. Yet they would need 15 times that number to gain first-strike capability against our land-based missiles alone. Such a build-up would require huge Soviet expenditures, to say nothing of the costs of trying to design anti-submarine systems that also would be required if first-strike power were ever to be achieved.

If the U.S. is threatening to accelerate an ABM race simply as a means of forcing a Soviet halt to further offensive and defensive missile development, a case conceivably can be made for authorizing the start of planning for Mr. Nixon's so-called "Safeguard" system. On that point we are prepared to reserve judgment.

The Pentagon, however, appears to think that the Soviet Union presently is deluding itself into believing that it someday can destroy the U.S. without destroying itself and the world in the process. If Sec. Laird really believes that, a modified ABM system will be no defense against such madness. We will simply have to bankrupt ourselves, install unreliable ABMs around cities and missile bases, build more and more offensive missiles, bombers and submarines . . . and await the apocalypse.

[From the Milwaukee (Wis.) Journal, Apr. 14, 1969]

ESCALATING THE TERROR

Senators McGovern (D-S. D.) and Kennedy (D-Mass.) have accused the Nixon administration of using "terror tactics" to sell the Safeguard antiballistic missile system to congress and the American people. McGovern has complained that the country has "had a whole series of rationalizations for Safeguard from the administration. . . . Now it seems to me they are escalating the terror rather than giving us any enlightenment."

Defense Secretary Laird has argued for building the Safeguard system to protect American missiles from the continued deployment by the Soviet Union of its large SS-9 intercontinental ballistic missile, capable of carrying a 25 megaton thermonuclear warhead. Recently he said that the Russians were testing multiple warheads that would make the missile even more potent.

The Soviet's ultimate aim, he claims, is a first strike capability that could utterly destroy America's retaliatory power and leave it defenseless.

Scientist Ralph Lapp responds that even using the most dismal Pentagon estimates of Soviet capabilities it is unlikely that Russia could gain a first strike capability with the SS-9.

Such "fright" tactics are not unknown in the cold war. On the advice of the late Sen. Arthur Vandenberg (R-Mich.), President Truman in 1947 deliberately acted to frighten the American people about the danger of Soviet expansionism to push through congress the Truman doctrine of military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey.

Use of like tactics has led in many cases to reliance on militarism, defense and weap-

ons as the simple answers to complicated problems of foreign policy, whether they be the Lebanon landing, the Bay of Pigs invasion, the occupation of the Dominican Republic or the Vietnam war.

Kennedy has pointed out that congress has been all too eager "to accept on faith the recommendations of the Pentagon."

Even if Laird is right about Russia's first strike capability, there is no way, given present technology, that a "thinly deployed" Safeguard system or an extremely expensive, "thickly deployed" ABM system could completely protect the United States from such an onslaught.

Congress should not succumb to any campaign of fear in considering the Safeguard proposition. Let it rather, by its action, show the new administration that it wants more vigorous efforts toward peace and disarmament, not more nuclear weapons unless they are justified by reason and proved need.

[From the Lewiston (Idaho) Tribune, Mar. 22, 1969]

SIMPLE WAYS TO BOMB A NATION

The best and really the only fairly reliable defense against nuclear attack is an offense—the ability to respond in kind. It is the celebrated balance of terror under which neither side can dispose of the enemy without committing suicide.

But, other than the balance, based as much on fear as hardware, there is really no such thing as a perfect shield against nuclear attack or any great chance of one being developed.

It doesn't require technical knowledge to know that. Common sense will suffice. For example, as Dr. Ralph E. Lapp, a physicist who appeared at a Washington State University political institute this week noted, the ABM system currently proposed could not cope with massive dirty bombs exploded from rafts off the West Coast with the fallout drifting over the mainland. Nor could the ABM cope with nuclear weapons exploded from ships in dozens of American harbors. Or nuclear weapons erected piece by piece in a building in the heart of an inland city.

The proposed ABM system is a conventional response to a conventional nuclear attack (to use an extreme use of the word conventional). But there are no guarantees that anyone intent on doing this nation harm will deliver weapons in a nice, neat ballistic missile fashion susceptible to a nice, neat ballistic missile response.

Even if, at a cost of billions, this nation should be able to develop a workable ABM system (which many scientists doubt), there are numerous ways around it.

Play the game yourself. Assume that the Soviet Union and the Red Chinese have antiballistic missile systems, capable of stopping all conventionally-launched missiles from the United States. If it became your intention for this nation to strike first against them, try to think of the many ways you could penetrate their shield—relatively simple ways like smuggling the parts of a hydrogen bomb into their ports and major cities, or hitting them with fallout from afar.

But what if you knew that your success would be greeted with a counterattack on this nation? That would give you pause. That, and not hardware, is what would deter you.

And, if that would not deter you, it is unlikely that anything else would. You would then proceed to work around the enemy's futile sophisticated defense system.

An American ABM system might be able one day to cope for a time with some of the incoming missiles launched in the sophisticated fashion. But a sophisticated defense cannot always cope with an unsophisticated attack.

It would be far simpler and far less expensive to bolster what is already our best defense—the fear of U.S. retaliation. Rather than involve this nation's wealth, time and talent in the enormously expensive effort to develop something new, different and probably futile, America should concentrate on the far less expensive and far more reliable alternative—increasing the number of retaliatory missiles in our arsenal.

The mold for the Minuteman has already been made. The development cost is behind us. Cranking out a few dozen more copies would be far less costly—and a good deal faster—than this naive scheme to bleed the taxpayers of billions for a system that no one can guarantee will work half as well as simply installing more ICBMs and thereby enhancing the enemy's fear of retaliation.

If there was ever any validity to that old right wing saw about the Communists trying to get America to spend herself to death, it would be ironic if the \$80-billion-per-year Defense Department—rather than Medicare and higher teacher salaries—turned out to be the principal contributor to our economic downfall.

It is beginning to appear that the ABM system we need most is an Anti-Bankruptcy Move against our own military leaders.

[From the Anderson (S.C.) Independent, Apr. 4, 1969]

HOW WOULD LIMITED ABM DEFENSE FORESTALL INSANE ACTION BY CHINESE?

We take as our text today the assertion by President Nixon, to the National Association of Broadcasters, that his decision to go ahead and spend \$6.5 billion on the Safeguard antiballistic missile system was necessary because "we find within the last third of a century that sometimes decisions by great powers, as well as small, are not made by rational men . . . Hitler was not a particularly rational man in some of his military decisions."

Now the existence of human irrationality, in high places as well as in low, is hardly a matter of debate.

But without making any invidious comparisons, we think it well to inquire as to whether the ABM decision is itself a rational calculation which tallors means to the end we all seek—the security of our nation.

Consider first the specter, which ABM proponents keep raising, of the Red Chinese menace.

True enough, "the heathen Chinese is peculiar," but the fact remains that since seizing power in the late 1940s the Chinese Communists have, in their foreign relations, shown a remarkable restraint.

This is not to say that they have not committed aggression; they have, notably in Korea in 1950 and, a few years later in Tibet.

But the act of aggression, while much to be condemned, of course, is not in itself necessarily an "irrational" decision.

It can be, and in Korea and Tibet was, a rationally calculated move, and it may also be noted that notwithstanding Peking's pyrotechnic propaganda about our own alleged "aggression" in Vietnam, it has refrained—rationally, we might suggest—from inviting annihilation by sending its troops into Vietnam.

Nevertheless, let us suppose the worst.

Assume that, sometime in 1973 or after, the leaders of Red China are so irrational that they decide to unleash nuclear missiles upon the United States.

How in the name of rationality would our having spent \$6.5 billion, or upwards of eight times that much money, on an ABM defense, possibly dissuade them?

Insane people do not understand the counsels of sanity; insane people are insane.

With our retaliatory capacity as of now, as Mr. Nixon himself points out, we could wipe out half the population of China.

Under no conceivable circumstances can Red China ever possess a "first-strike capability" which could knock out the ability to respond possessed by our nuclear submarines alone.

If the inevitability of obliteration could not affect an insane calculation, why should the possibility of a very limited defense affect it any more?

The Nixon decision bears the hallmarks not of rationality but of rationalization.

The President says it was also necessary "because we found that the Soviet Union had developed new weapons with great accuracy."

His Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird, is developing his own weapon—"the technique of fear," as Sen. J. William Fulbright calls it—to peddle the Safeguard system.

Mr. Laird asserts that the Soviets "are going for our missiles, and they are going for a first-strike capability. There is no question about that."

But there are many questions about that.

The Soviet SS-9, from which Mr. Laird has suddenly unveiled the secrecy, was regarded by the Defense Department, and the Senate Armed Services Committee so informed, as a "second-strike" weapon. Which is it?

And how effective would the Safeguard system be against it?

As Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Fulbright observed, the Russians are not "very bothered" about the ABM, "because I am sure, they know, as nearly every witness outside the Pentagon knows, it is not much good."

The one thing we concede that it would be good for is the "military-industrial complex" whose "unwarranted influence," President Eisenhower warned against in his last message to Congress.

"The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist," the general correctly foresaw. It certainly exists and does persist in the Nixon administration.

[From the Michigan Catholic, Mar. 20, 1969]

DEFENSIVE MISSILES BALK DISARMAMENT

Given the growing opposition consensus against it and the almost universal scientific testimony to its futility, President Nixon's decision concerning the Sentinel ABM system may have been appropriate. It is appropriate, at least, if one buys the theory that a little bit of nothing is better than a whole lot of nothing.

We have been told and the administration seemingly agrees, that the Sentinel system would be useless against a massive Russian attack. It might prove effective against a Chinese attack which is non-existent now and would be real only if the Chinese were to attack before they possessed a Russian capability. And this is not likely.

Now, instead of locating the missiles near heavily populated areas which have reacted to possible placement near them as if the Sentinel were a hot potato, plans are to locate in two remote areas of Montana and North Dakota. Thus will some of our ICBMs be protected.

We also have been told that our second strike capabilities with ICBMs, even if we were attacked first, are overwhelming enough now to destroy any aggressor nation several times over. We might assume then that if Russia, or any other attacking nation, were to destroy even many of our ICBM sites, we still would be able to incinerate our enemy, only we would not be able to kick his ashes about very much.

The decision to go ahead limitedly and remotely may calm the real selfish fears of city dwellers who worry that a mistake in their own backyard would lead to their own private little doomsday. But this new Maginot line does not solve the problem of waste and misplacement.

So the initial investment is a mere \$6 or \$7 billion. That, however, would feed a lot of

people, build a lot of homes, clear a lot of slums.

And it does not much matter that the ABM Sentinel system is called "Safeguard". A wasteful missile system by any other name is equally harmful.

It is not that our country should not be defended. It is that we've about gone beyond the point of defense. Only the balance of terror—that a mistake or miscalculation by one man on either side could wipe this beautiful planet out of the heavens—protects us.

In the light of this we opt for supervised disarmament, already suggested by the Soviet Union. Even our polluted air would go down better if no one has a nuclear button he can push.

It is still possible for Congress to waylay this expenditure before it gets into the ground. The administration has ignored congressional advice, now is the time for Congress to withhold its consent.

Our congressmen can prove that even the middle of the road can sometimes be dangerous.

[From the San Antonio (Tex.) Express, Mar. 24, 1969]

WEAKNESSES BEGIN TO SHOW UP IN ARGUMENT FOR ANTI-MISSILES

Phase Two of President Nixon's decision to deploy a "thin" anti-missile system has begun. It is the sharp criticism being aimed at the decision by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, whose members include the Senate's ranking "doves."

On this issue, nearly half the Senate has stated its opposition to the Nixon decision. The committee is giving the Administration abundant opportunity to say why the decision was made as it was. Best point scored so far is that an intent to deploy is a trading point in talks with Russia. Russia is reputed to have deployed some anti-missiles and Defense Secretary Laird professes to believe the Russians are working on "something" that might jeopardize the American Polaris fleet.

It is difficult to argue with Laird that any error we make should be on the side of safety, but it is not difficult to argue that the ABM has few backers who say it will do what it is supposed to do. Fewer still think the cost estimates will remain as low as they are—which is horrendously high.

The thing that weakens the Pentagon argument is that both Laird and Deputy Secretary David Packard admitted Friday that U.S. experts don't know enough to protect cities—so the missiles will be deployed around offensive missiles in place now. Until Nixon made his decision, the argument was all for emplacement around cities and, in fact, that was the point of initial heated opposition.

We don't think the Russians think any more of anti-missiles than some of the American opponents. A better case needs to be made.

[From the Waynesboro (Va.) News-Virginian, Apr. 1, 1969]

NO SUCH THING AS LIMITED ABM

Planning strategy for World War III is called "thinking about the unthinkable."

It is not just that a thermonuclear holocaust is too horrible to contemplate. It is that there are simply too many variables, possibilities and unknown quantities for anyone to know what would really happen should someone actually initiate a "missile exchange."

Underlying President Nixon's proposal for a limited antiballistic missile system to protect the nation's missile sites is one basic assumption—that an enemy, to have any hope of "winning," would have to give first priority to wiping out or crippling his opponent's retaliatory strength.

Thus it follows logically that an ABM system that guarantees—or makes an enemy be-

June 19, 1969

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 6781

Have it guarantees—that some of our retaliatory strength would survive a first strike would be an effective means of staying his hand and preserving peace.

The logic fails to hold up upon closer examination, however.

It conflicts with another basic assumption, which is that an enemy would have to shoot his entire nuclear war in the beginning. While he might save a few missiles to mop up a few cities or other countries afterwards, if he hasn't obliterated his opponent, including his opponent's population centers as well as missile sites, in the first round, then he has failed.

The only feasible course for an aggressor would be to inflict as much punishment as he could in a first strike and hope that the second-strike punishment he would have to take would be at an "acceptable" level—say 20 or 30 million dead.

Thus Russia's missiles, should they ever come, would come not by twos or threes but in battalions. It is impossible to imagine that a president, faced with a radar horizon sparkling with the blips of hundreds of oncoming missiles due to explode all over the country in 15 minutes, would order that only our ABMs be fired. It is impossible to imagine this even if there were an ABM ring around every city.

Not unless there existed a 100 per cent perfect defense against a missile attack could a president hold back immediate, total retaliation—and a 100 per cent perfect defense is something that not even the staunchest advocates of the ABM claim is possible.

Because of this fact, the ABM has been put forward as a short-term defense against the Chinese, who at present have only a handful of intercontinental missiles.

But crazy as the Red Chinese seem to be, it is also impossible to imagine them wasting their few missiles against our missile sites and sparing our cities, while inviting devastating retaliation upon themselves.

Thus, it is argued, there can be no such thing as a limited ABM system. Either the nation foregoes the ABM entirely, or it must embark on a full-scale megabillion-dollar program to include the cities—and even this could be easily nullified by an enemy simply by doubling or tripling his missile-launching capability.

It is said that President Nixon is really using the ABM to get the Russians to sit down for some serious talks about disarmament. But it seems a terribly expensive and roundabout way to appeal to Russian logic.

Surely they have as many people thinking about the unthinkable as we do.

[From the Marquette (Mich.) Mining Journal, Apr. 1, 1969]

THE ABM ISSUE

A matter which looms even bigger than the Vietnam war in its potential for influence upon the future safety of the United States is the ABM issue.

The letters stand for Anti-Ballistic Missile and refer to the plan for a defense system against enemy ballistic missiles which our government embarked upon in the Johnson administration. With a system of radars and anti-missile missiles, the project would try to shoot down enemy missiles before they could reach targets in this country.

President Nixon reviewed the ABM project and compromised on it. The Defense Department's start on construction of ABM installations in Eastern cities was drawing lots of public flak. Mr. Nixon's compromise suggests that the anti-missile missile batteries be set up at major missile installations in Montana and North Dakota to "protect our deterrent." That is, to protect our missiles from attack. The intention would still be to lessen the damage and deaths from a nuclear attack on the United States, but the political pressure building up against the ABM proj-

ect might be lessened by not proceeding with deployment of ABMs in big cities.

Defense Secretary Melvin Laird has urged approval of the compromise plan in testimony before a Senate committee. The current effort is an end run around political opposition and widespread concern that this first "thin" ABM plan is really the first step in military strategy to construct an extremely costly "heavy" ABM system to attempt to defend most of the big population centers of the country.

Our reaction to the threat of nuclear missile attack up until recently has been reliance upon "massive retaliation" with our own intercontinental ballistic missiles to deter any aggressor. (The only nation capable of a massive nuclear missile attack upon us at present is Soviet Russia, but our defense leaders are increasingly concerned that Red China, with its nuclear capability, will develop the ability to attack with missiles with nuclear warheads. Our fears are stimulated by China's refusal to enter any nuclear control agreement.)

The ABM project is being opposed for a number of reasons:

1. An inherent distrust by politicians of the military, which traditionally wants to solve its problems of defending the nation by mustering a defense capability superior to any enemy's, and then using it, if necessary, to settle issues (by war) that won't yield to diplomacy.

2. The impossibility of knowing for sure whether an ABM will work until it is actually used, when it would be too late to do anything about its failure.

3. That it may be one more step in escalating the arms race with Russia. We get nuclear bombs, they get nuclear bombs. They build an ABM system; we build an ABM system.

4. The conviction that we are building toward a military holocaust that will destroy much of the human race with our stockpiling of nuclear weapons.

5. But especially and most importantly because our problems of living with Russia and Red China can only be solved by political solutions, not by nuclear weapons.

Americans who remember so well when Nikita Khrushchev sneaked atomic missiles into Cuba with the thought of confronting us with their deployment 90 miles from our shores, will be wary of believing that good will will keep Russia from starting a nuclear war.

But even if we both were to build an ABM defense system to match our deterrent forces of intercontinental missiles, the problem of preventing war still would remain. We cannot forever march step for step in an arms race and expect the deterrent and the deterrent defense to protect us by technology.

For that we must have leaders in the major nations who will accept restraints. We ourselves have not been without sin in this matter. We had nuclear weapons in Turkey, as close to Russia as Cuba is to us. We must somehow wage peace as extensively as we now commit ourselves to military hardware in the fragile hope that will avoid war in a troubled peace of military standoff.

[From the Lancaster (Pa.) Intelligencer Journal, Apr. 8, 1969]

NOT CONVINCING

It is of course, entirely possible that Secretary of Defense Laird is correct when he says the Soviet Union is testing a triple warhead nose cone for the big SS9 rocket he considers a threat to U.S. missiles.

However the news is hardly surprising. This nation's 1,000 land-based Minuteman missiles now have only one warhead, but the U.S. plans to equip some of them with three warheads. Additionally, the U.S. testing of what it calls the multiple independently re-entry vehicles (MIRV) has been under way since last year.

So it would be a logical step for Moscow to attempt to keep pace with the U.S. nuclear capability by putting triple warheads on the 500 SS9's it reportedly has deployed around Moscow.

However, Secretary Laird's announcement must be considered in context. His record for credibility has suffered of late. Last week, for instance, the Pentagon quietly went about correcting some testimony he and his deputy, David Packard, had given before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He said this nation's missiles could be disarmed or aborted after a launch. They can't.

Another inconsistency—Secretary Laird in his testimony to the Senate Committee supporting a proposed anti-ballistic system, said "With their large tonnage warheads, they (the Russians) are going for a first strike capability—there is no question about that."

Yesterday, he said: "I've always made it clear that I do not believe the Soviet Union would be foolish enough . . . to go forward with a first strike."

It is probable that what Secretary Laird is attempting is to sway enough wavering Congressmen to support the Safeguard ABM system President Nixon has proposed. This is the system the president has modified from a \$5.8 billion Democratic Sentinel into a \$7.2 billion Safeguard whose mission it is to protect some of this nation's Minutemen in their silos in the northern United States.

The whole rationale of this proposed ABM system is illogical. If Russia is intending, as Sen. Russell intimated the other day, to build up its nuclear missile strength to such superiority that "they will not have to fire a missile but simply say 'this is it'," then the ABM is a totally inadequate response.

If the Administration truly believes the Soviets want to be able to start a war without fear of reprisals, then there should be an immediate beginning on a "thick" ABM system, offensive forces should be beefed up, and fallout shelters built for the country's inhabitants.

Until much more persuasive evidence is presented than has been presented so far, there is considerable doubt that either the Congress or the people of the U.S. will do otherwise than view the ABM's Safeguard of Sentinel, other than an expensive boondoggle.

[From the Ann Arbor (Mich.) News, Mar. 20, 1969]

U.S. MILITARY TAKEOVER NOT IMMINENT, BUT . . .

President Eisenhower, in his leave taking of the presidency, warned his countrymen of the growing influence of the military-industrial complex. He also warned about the tendency of installed power to magnify itself.

The man who succeeded him, President Kennedy, is quoted as saying that there was scarcely a serious problem confronting the U.S. abroad in which the Pentagon did not advise him to use military force. Cuba is a notable example.

Against this backdrop of surging militarism in U.S. government the entire anti-ballistic missile (ABM) issue stands as a kind of exclamation point. Belatedly, the country and the Congress are coming to their senses about the staggering costs of the ABM system, and the type of thinking to which President Kennedy alluded.

Norman Cousins, writing in the Saturday Review, stated the problem in this way: "Is military power becoming an end in itself and a law unto itself? It is no answer to declare that the men at the head of (the defense establishment) are balanced, intelligent, sober, responsible. This is not the issue.

"The issue is whether a context of power is now being created beyond the ability of even the best men to change.

"At the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention of 1787-89 . . . it was decided to create good government through good laws

and good structure. This meant preventing runaway power situations.

"Today, the system of checks and balances has become seriously impaired through both the massive spending power of the military and its ability to take actions and to create situations in the field that force the hand of the President."

Throughout the burgeoning Sentinel controversy, the Secretary of State has been a silent party. What are Americans to conclude as concerns who is calling the tune on the ABM? It is not the Congress, the body from which massive military appropriations must come.

Is it then the Executive, the man who proposes? Well, hardly, because we are led to believe that because the Soviet Union had taken initial steps to build their own ABM our own President's hand was forced and he had no other choice but to give the green light to the Sentinel backers.

Thus by process of elimination only the Pentagon is left. Its new occupant, Defense Secretary Laird, has been one of Sentinel's most vocal supporters.

The American system of checks and balances traditionally is thought of as three branches acting as brakes on each other. The institutions of the military have been part of this scheme of government only insofar as they have served civilian authority and true power was kept in the hands of qualified decision-makers. But if the executive and the judiciary and the legislative act as checks upon each other, who checks the power of the military?

This is the question Americans must ask of their government and the Nixon administration must resolve before matters of national security are beyond recall.

[From the San Francisco Chronicle, June 3, 1967]

SAFEGUARD AND THE SECRET CHART

Senator Stuart Symington, one of 49 ABM doubters in the Senate, says the Department of Defense is not making public what it admits in secret sessions about the Safeguard missile system.

If a secret Pentagon chart were released, the controversy over whether to deploy the ABM at a cost of \$6 billion would in his view be resolved. He implies that the military would be sent back to their drawing boards for more research on the weapon.

It is frustrating to be told that the answer to a serious question in public controversy cannot be given to the public. All that the ordinary citizen can judge from Symington's statement is that secret information has evidently fortified his doubts. Since he is one of Congress' best informed men on defense matters, as a former Secretary of the Air Force and a former electronics industrialist, these doubts carry weight.

So what the secret chart shows is anyone's guess. Our guess, based on the interesting and presumably authoritative letter of Dr. Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky of Stanford which we published last Friday, is that the chart shows the Safeguard system to be ill-designed and inadequate to do the job it is touted to do—i.e., protect the U.S. Minuteman missile sites.

The number of ABM interceptors is so small that only a tiny fraction of an incoming force which might be a threat to Minuteman can be intercepted, Dr. Panofsky wrote. He charged that the Defense Department "has frightened us by a projected threat (from the Soviet SS-9 missile), but has hidden the extent by which the proposed Safeguard system could possibly decrease that threat."

In the view of this distinguished radiation physicist, who is the director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, Safeguard "may or may not work." It is a "bad compromise"; its radar is much more vulnerable than the missile sites it is expected to defend, and it

costs a great deal more than the value of the few Minutemen which, on optimum performance, it could save.

Conceivably, Dr. Panofsky does not know all that needs to be known in order to evaluate Safeguard. Senator Symington may not know, either. Certainly the public doesn't. But these two men are in a growing company of those who know enough about ABM Safeguard to have informed doubts, and it seems to us that the Senate has no more pressing obligation than ruthlessly to pursue these.

[From the Tupelo (Miss.) Journal, Apr. 7, 1969]

IT'S DEFENSE THAT NIXON NEEDS TO RUN

President Nixon reportedly has about decided to be his own Secretary of State, leaning heavily on the Defense Department and the National Security Council for advice and using the man he appointed to the State post, Bill Rogers, largely for administrative matters within the department.

This is not a particularly new approach. A number of modern Presidents have, in effect, doubled as Secretary of State in policy making matters.

But it is new, and possibly quite dangerous, for President Nixon to lean so heavily on the Defense Department as his guide to a peaceful world.

For the Defense Department under Secretary Melvin Laird is creating the No. 1 "credibility gap" in the new administration.

And if his free-wheeling statements made without noticeable ability to back up their truthfulness continue, America may find itself in need of a costly overhaul of its defenses without the public support to foot the bill.

For once it ceases to believe what the Defense Department is saying, the public may fail to support even the most pressing military needs. Then not just the Nixon administration but the whole country could be in serious danger.

Laird was caught in his first apparently false statement on the ABM issue when he told a congressional committee that at least one scientist outside his department had supported the anti-missile defense network during a lengthy discussion with Laird.

That scientist, however, a few days later denied that he had ever discussed the issue in any detail with Laird, it being only rather casually mentioned when they met in an airport.

Then Laird undertook to discredit one of the most effective witnesses against the ABM, Herbert York, who was director of Pentagon research and engineering during the Eisenhower administration.

York said that the speed of action required to activate the ABM missiles against attacking nuclear weapons was such that the President could not be brought into the decision making process at all. One low level man in uniform would have to make the decision whether the nuclear ABM missiles were to be fired if they were to have any chance of shooting down the enemy missiles, he testified before Congress.

Secretary Laird then came up with the argument that York could be expected to oppose the ABM because he also had not thought the Polaris submarine missile would work.

York pointed out shortly in a telegram to Republican Congressman J. Sherman Cooper of Kentucky that he had at all times recommended to the Department of Defense that the Polaris submarine missile be developed and deployed.

The record indicated that York, not Laird, was telling the truth. And the credibility gap of the Nixon administration on military matters widened further.

Then it was disclosed that Laird had deliberately or otherwise misled the Ameri-

can public on the question of whether launching our anti-missiles would in effect be opening a nuclear war against America's own towns and cities.

The fact is that both the Spring and Spartan nuclear missiles which we would fire against attacking enemy missiles are armed before they are fired—meaning they are set to go off whenever they hit something. And they do not have any self-destruct system by which the ground crew could blow them up if they missed their target in the air.

Thus what is proposed is that American nuclear missiles be fired into the air ready to explode wherever they come down anywhere from 25 to 400 miles from the point of firing.

And in view of the number of missiles planned eventually for America's anti-missile defense network, we could end up hitting American people with more American nuclear missiles than the enemy could fire at us.

Adding to the significance of the growing credibility gap in the Defense Department are reports that the new administration already plans to spend \$100 billion on new weapons alone.

Aides to President Nixon have stated that he plans to boost military spending by 1971 to \$75 billion in addition to whatever Vietnam may be costing at that time.

Not even at the peak year of World War II did military expenditures in this country run so high.

And if President Nixon expects to sell Congress and the public on such expenditures, it is essential that he insist upon honesty and openness in Defense Department relations with the American people at all times.

Thus far we are not getting such an approach.

Rather, Defense Secretary Laird is operating more like a free-wheeling congressman who could depend on the other 534 members of the House and Senate to correct any misstatements or errors he might make.

This level of integrity is not adequate for a department which plans to boost annual military outlays to something like \$85 to \$90 billion a year for many years to come.

Thus if President Nixon has the time to take over any of his cabinet operations, the Defense Department seems to need his attention most.

[From the Salina (Kans.) Journal, May 3, 1969]

A DASH OF SALT FOR ABM HISTRIONICS?

The nation is divided on the anti-ballistic missile issue.

So are military men. So are scientists. And so are politicians.

For example, Kansas Senator James Pearson doubts the value of the program while Kansas Senator Bob Dole supports it. Both, incidentally, have excellent records of military service.

For as it is difficult to fathom, President Nixon has taken a tough line in behalf of the proposal. He is giving it an arm-twisting hard sell. Shades of Lyndon Johnson!

As part of that sell, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird is going about the country evoking the Red Menace. We are being told, in effect, that the Russians can wipe us out if we do not go ahead with ABM installations. And if not the Russians, then the Chinese.

This may work. The Communists have been bogeymen for two generations. The Pentagon has secret information to which ordinary Americans are not privy. If the issue in truth is one of national security, the commander-in-chief should be supported.

Then again we have been fooled in such matters. History now reports that President Roosevelt helped bring about Pearl Harbor. The Tonkin Gulf incident which brought us full steam into the Vietnam war has been shown since to have been

June 19, 1969

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 6783

over-blown. The wars that were to stem the Red Tide in China, Burma, Korea and Vietnam have not done so.

We recall that past Presidents have traded on missile gaps that disappeared when they won office. We remember the vast sums wasted on Nike pits and ICBM silos—even here in Salina. We know about the costly aircraft that wouldn't fly and the missiles that didn't fire.

Wolf has been cried too often. But then again, is the need for a Safeguard system genuine this time?

Unfortunately, we can't wait for history's verdict. Hindsight is ahead of us. The issue is now, for the Congressmen pressing.

However, in the light of sincere, patriotic and informed division of opinion about Nixon's ABMs, he should not be surprised if the histrionics of his helpers are taken with a dash of salt.

[From the Honolulu (Hawaii) Advertiser, Mar. 15, 1969]

WRONG ABM DECISION

President Nixon's decision to go ahead with a modified antiballistic missile system is a disappointment. He has found and taken a compromise middle course that will please few and accomplish little at a high cost.

The system may be another Maginot Line, as one senator suggested. More important is whether it will lead to greater long-range security dangers than it aims to prevent.

With his polished press conference style, the President did make his decision look as good as possible:

There was the new name, "Safeguard." The system will be away from major cities (presumably including Honolulu), protecting our offensive missiles instead of people. It is supposed to be security against Chinese missiles while no threat the Russians should take seriously. It won't lead to a costly "thick" system, he said.

Some may feel grateful the President didn't decide for the \$40 billion thick system to go around our major cities. But he seems to have gone as far as he thinks is politically possible at this time.

Many of the questions about the ABM remain:

Highly reputable scientists, nationally and here, feel it is a relatively simple matter for even the Chinese to develop decoys and other aids to penetrate such a system.

President Nixon made the point it would at least serve as protection against any accidental firing of a Russian missile, presuming such a Soviet missile was aimed at our missile sites and not a city.

The odds on such an accident are probably as great as for one of our "Safeguard" nuclear missiles accidentally blowing up on the ground.

Furthermore, it seems obvious the first thing the Russians will do is give high priority to making missiles which, whether fired on purpose or by accident, would be designed to penetrate our ABM system.

So the next step would be a new system for us, followed by more sophisticated missiles for them, then another system for us, etc.

This is perhaps the saddest part about the President's decision, for even if labeled defensive it follows the old arms race path that at best can lead only to costly nuclear stalemate and at worst to total destruction.

Inevitably such defense system developments as these while starting out small (\$6 billion, yet) have a way of expanding in size and cost.

We may or may not end up with a thick system.

We are virtually certain in the name of dubious, even dangerous, security to end up with a thinner checkbook to finance needier programs.

One does not envy President Nixon this kind of decision. Still it is what we elect presidents for, and it is a pity he did not try a more imaginative course.

As the ABM seem aimed at being more a political than a practical safeguard for the Johnson Administration, so it appears to be a compromise for Nixon.

The battle now moves to Congress where the President seems likely to face his first major struggle. The honeymoon is clearly over.

[From the Louisville (Ky.) Courier-Journal, Apr. 19, 1969]

HOLES ARE STARTING TO SHOW IN THE ARGUMENT FOR THE ABM

In their references to new and frighteningly powerful Soviet missiles, which they claim make the ABM Safeguard system vital to our survival, President Nixon and Secretary of Defense Laird are toying with something equally dangerous from a political viewpoint—revival of the credibility gap. Mr. Nixon simply cannot afford to have the public suspect that he is being less than completely candid about our defense spending. Yet the suspicion—and the evidence—is growing that the public is being hoodwinked about both the ABM and the Soviet SS-9.

In appealing for billions of dollars to begin development of the ABM system, both President Nixon and Secretary Laird declared that the anti-ballistic missile system had become necessary to counter Soviet development of a super-powerful, 25-megaton warhead missile, the SS-9. The ABM, they admitted, would not protect our cities against nuclear attack, and was not designed to. But it would prevent the SS-9 from destroying our Minuteman missiles in their concrete silos and thus robbing us of our ability to respond to an attack with a devastating counterattack.

To make his appeal to Congress more dramatic, Mr. Laird revealed information about the SS-9 that had previously been classified as secret by the Pentagon, including the claim that it carried a 25-megaton warhead that could demolish Minuteman silos within a wide area. President Nixon repeated this reference to the SS-9 warhead, and added that the ABM was also needed to protect us against weapons the Chinese might develop by 1973 or 1974.

INCONSISTENCIES AND HOKUM

But inconsistencies and signs of hokum are beginning to creep into this argument. As *Los Angeles Times* columnist Tom Braden and Frank Mankiewicz have pointed out, Mr. Laird's declassification of data on the SS-9 may have been dramatic but it was also unnecessary and misleading. There was no reason why the Pentagon should have classified the data in the first place, since it had already been published in 1968 in Jane's *All the World's Aircraft*, which is commercially published and circulated.

And the facts about the SS-9, as revealed by Jane's, and by our own CIA, are quite different from the scare statistics quoted by the President and Mr. Laird. It is by no means a super-weapon. In fact, as Braden and Mankiewicz point out, it is no more horrible and considerably less efficient than many weapons in our own arsenal. Indeed, it is quite comparable to the Titan I missile that we are now dismantling as obsolete.

Nor is there any proof, or even evidence, that the SS-9 carries the 25-megaton warhead mentioned by the President and Mr. Laird. Assistant Defense Secretary David Packard admitted to questioning Senators that "it might be 20 megatons," and the CIA report says flatly that it carries only a 5-megaton warhead. If this is so, the SS-9 poses no real threat to Minuteman sites, for whose protection the ABM is being urged.

Furthermore, the SS-9 was designed not for use against such hard targets but against cities, which the ABM is not intended to protect. Repeatedly, in their initial appeals for ABM, the President and Mr. Laird emphasized not our cities, and would not be deployed to protect cities. Yet in his Friday press conference President Nixon said it was needed to protect our cities against the pos-

sibility of a Chinese missile attack sometime within the next decade.

These are not the only holes in the ABM argument. Mr. Laird told the Senate that Russia is the only country to fire an ABM at an incoming missile. Yet former Defense Secretary Clark Clifford quoted Pentagon officials when he declared in his defense of the ABM that "as long as seven years ago we demonstrated we could destroy incoming missiles." In its plea for the ABM the Defense Department said it had consulted Dr. Wolfgang Panofsky, the noted Stanford physicist. Dr. Panofsky says flatly he was not consulted.

Someone, in brief, is not telling the truth. Someone is not leveling with the American people. The last time that happened it created a thing called the credibility gap, and the man trapped in it never quite managed to scramble out. It could happen again with the ABM.

[From the Boston Globe, Feb. 6, 1969]

WELCOME SIGNS OF ABM FREEZE

The unbelievable is happening. After nearly two decades of rubber-stamping Defense Department requests, the U.S. Senate is learning how to say "No." Hawk and Dove, Republican and Democrat, have served notice that they want more facts and figures on the controversial ABM Sentinel system—or else!

Many of the objectors are the same senators who only weakly opposed mere portions of the overall \$1.2 billion ABM appropriation last year. But this year there is a difference. The folks back home in Chicago, Seattle and the north-of-Boston suburbs, where land procurement for the ABM sites is underway, are now acutely aware of this so-called "thin line" missile set-up.

The new Senate Majority Whip, Edward M. Kennedy, best summed up the view of his constituents and his colleagues alike when he called the present plans to deploy the ABM system in densely populated areas "a serious mistake," if not "a complete waste."

His request that President Nixon freeze the program while Congress resolves questions of site and effectiveness is reasonable and logical. The fact that the new Armed Services chairman, Mississippi Sen. John Stennis, readily agreed to hear scientific testimony on the effectiveness of the ABM is further justification for the immediate freeze Kennedy and other Senate critics ask.

Republican Sen. Everett M. Dirksen's statement that "it is time to take a cooler and more deliberate look at this proposal" provides bipartisan assurance of a searching review.

Perhaps the first question any Senate inquiry should demand a definitive answer to is the estimated cost of the "thin line." During Tuesday's debate Sen. Edward W. Brooke said the Pentagon told him the Sentinel system would cost \$5.8 billion. Not so, said Sen. Stuart Symington, a former Air Force Secretary. His Pentagon sources, perhaps more reliable than Brooke's, put current estimates at \$9.4 billion. And that, more than anything else, is why Sen. Charles Percy was speaking for more than his Illinois constituents when he warned: "We are on the brink of a decision whose magnitude in cost could be comparable to the Vietnam war. We should know what we are doing before we get into it."

Whatever the ultimate fate of the ABM system, the Senate's new-found critical voice on defense expenditures happily foreshadows the day when less money is spent on excessive armaments and more on the correction on social ills.

[From the Western News, Apr. 3, 1969]

HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?

President Nixon's decision to modify his predecessor's plans for an anti-ballistics missile defense system and to proceed with con-

June 19, 1969

struction of only two remote installations rather than the nation-girdling network proves that the chief executive is hardly more convinced of the need for the costly shield than are most Americans.

Officials of the Defense Department—under both Johnson and Nixon—are pressing for the ABM system because they believe it is their obligation to keep American the most powerful nation in the world. Neither a Republican nor a Democratic Secretary of Defense wants to go down in history as the man who let his nation's guard down so that it fell prey to a nuclear Pearl Harbor.

Many men in Congress feel, however, that even without an ABM system, American has sufficient power to retaliate after an attack and devastate the homeland of the attacker. Even now, the United States is said to have "over-kill" potential, power to inflict greater damage than any enemy could possibly recover from.

Because no reasonable commander-in-chief would order an attack in the expectation of such calamitous response, it is improbable that our present defense system will ever be unleashed in anger. Likewise the ABM would probably become only an unused monument to national preparedness.

The first two ABM sites at Great Falls and at Grand Forks, N.D., are expected to cost seven or eight billion dollars, a staggering cost but only a fraction of the total bill for the nationwide system.

This is a mighty large bill to hand to the American people for a weapons system that will provide little more deterrent than the existing arms.

If America already has the ammunition to wipe out an enemy population and the means to deliver that punch, added strength would seem to be an unnecessary cost.

[From the Deer Park (N.Y.) Suffolk Sun, Mar. 26, 1969]

NUCLEAR WEAPONRY: NEVER-NEVER LAND

The Pentagon has wheeled out its biggest oral guns to frighten the American people into believing that without the Sentinel ABM system the nation will be helpless in the face of an all-out nuclear attack.

If Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird's on-again off-again pronouncements about troop withdrawals from Vietnam are an example of the military establishment's current reasoning, we place no stock in his pitch for the Sentinel. What he and the brass pass over lightly in this case is that the nation will be just as helpless in an all-out attack with the system installed. Therefore, why spend billions of dollars to hold up a false front?

How much solace can scores of millions of potential victims get from an educated guess that the ABM network might save enough Minutemen sites to mount a nuclear counterattack? Few of us would be left to restore our own rubble, much less crow over enemy losses.

The thinking that has created this never-never land of nuclear confrontation is aptly expressed by Edmund Stillman in the current issue of *Horizon*. Experience, he argues, is the club with which an elder generation beats the young—but if no one can truly say what happened, and why, in history, the experience of the outgoing elders is less relevant than they may care to think.

"What may assert itself as the wisdom born of sad experience," he writes, "may only be the elders seeking to redeem the shame or folly of their own youth in wholly distinct or inappropriate circumstances—to the cost of the young."

These are good words to remember, particularly for the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and Americans who cannot forget.

[From the Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 1, 1969]

ABM ASSESSMENT IN THE OPEN

The Columbia Broadcasting System performed a commendable public service Tuesday night with a special hour-long television program devoted to full exposure of the antiballistic missile problem (ABM) in all its ramifications.

CBS examined every aspect and presented forceful speakers on both sides, those who believe the expensive—though modified—Safeguard system is necessary for the nation's protection and those who believe the United States is building up "overkill" apparatus at great expense and sacrifice.

CBS arrived at no conclusion.

But the whole issue was presented in neutral perspective for the public to assess.

A basic premise is that the United States government must protect the nation against attack from all directions. It has that awesome responsibility.

There is no argument there.

The argument is in the amount of money that should be diverted for this purpose and the extent of this designated defensive missile system.

Part of the debate is in semantics. President Nixon asks for a "sufficiency" of weapons, not necessarily a superiority. But if the layman is confused, so are the experts. On the CBS presentation, well-qualified scientists disagreed on the amount of defensive air hardware needed. Senators disagreed. How much is "sufficient?"

Scientists and military experts have gone to great lengths to explain how, in the case of surprise attack, our retaliatory power still would be great enough to knock out 70% of Russian cities and strategic warfare centers. This could happen, it is alleged, even though the United States suffered severe damage, possibly 50% destruction, in a sudden onslaught from the skies.

The situation calls for penetrating insight, not for a callous disregard for opposing opinion such as demonstrated this week by House Republican Leader Gerald Ford of Michigan who accused anti-ABM forces of advocating unilateral disarmament suggesting lack of patriotism.

Two avenues can be explored:

One is the possibility of suspending development of the \$7 billion Safeguard ABM if Russia would halt deployment of its defensive arms system and cease testing its multiple warhead missiles. In that interim, negotiations on arms limitations of all kinds could proceed. This involves a trust in the Soviet Union, which many people are unwilling to grant. But it ties in with the next item.

This is the further development of the aerial spy system, via satellite photography and sophisticated radar, to keep tabs on Russia—and now Red China, too. This might be a protection against duplicity while any formal moratorium on weapon production was in force.

If such a moratorium seems "far out" it should be remembered that Russia and the United States did reach agreement on limited nuclear testing.

The two superpowers have stocked up enough weapons to destroy each other—and the world—several times over. The mad arms race, in order to end sensibly, has to involve good will as well as caution and preparedness. The potential destructive power, as filmed by CBS, is appalling. The goal must be to keep the United States strong enough to be respected as a world leader and at the same time share its talents and resources in peaceful pursuits of science, education, welfare and global progress.

[From the Chicago Daily News, May 1, 1969]

FORD OVERSTEPS ON ABM

House Minority Leader Ford stepped out of a meeting with President Nixon on Tuesday and said that opponents of the antiballistic program are seeking a weak and disarmed America.

This kind of demagogic bombast contributes much less than nothing toward a rational resolution of the ABM problem. By slyly raising the patriotism issue it warrants the charge promptly raised of "McCarthyism."

Ford's implicit suggestion that the ABM decision should be left completely with the President and his military advisers ignores the fact that the issue thrusts far beyond the sphere of mere weaponry.

Many thoughtful, informed, patriotic Americans believe a choice is at hand between two major policy routes, one leading to a frantic, indefinitely protracted arms race, the other toward a disarmament agreement that may be within the world's grasp for the last time.

The American people deserve to hear this debate conducted in a reasonable manner.

[From the Miami (Fla.) News, Mar. 10, 1969]

NIXON'S DECISION: ABM IS NO ANSWER TO MISSILE THREAT

Sen. Stuart Symington, who is one of the more military-minded members of the Senate, said at a subcommittee hearing on an antiballistic missile system that we have spent \$23.3 million on missile systems that were later abandoned.

"We've been missile happy in this country for years," Symington said, and the senator should know, having once been secretary of the Air Force. His point was that the ABM system is likely to be obsolete before it is deployed.

It may be obsolete even on the drawing board. Dr. Hans Bethe, Nobel prize winning physicist, is one of a number of scientists who told the committee that the defensive missile system could be foiled in any number of ways.

Beyond its practical limitations, the ABM is questionable for other reasons. For one thing, it would be a highly negative answer to the Soviet Union, which has indicated it would prefer arms control discussions to the expense of installing a missile defense of its own. (The Russians have already deployed about 75 anti-missile missiles around Moscow, but they are of dubious value against a U.S. attack.)

These are matters which President Nixon is weighing as he prepares to state his administration's position on the ABM this week. The Johnson Administration had already decided to go ahead with a \$7 billion so-called "thin" ABM system, but Mr. Nixon has interrupted its installation pending further study.

Dr. Jerome D. Weisner of the MIT calls the thin system "a bad joke." Ostensibly designed to counter a threat from Red China, it is really the base for a wider system which would cost upwards of \$50 billion. Sen. George S. McGovern, one of many ABM critics in the Senate, says a "thick" system would be a "national blunder."

One big drawback to the ABM, as former Vice President Humphrey points out, is that it encourages military and political leaders of both nations to believe that someone can win a nuclear war. The only real answer to the doomsday threat of the missiles is an international agreement on arms control.

President Nixon has indicated he is interested in entering negotiations to that end with the Russians. The Russians have indicated they are ready. A decision to proceed

June 19, 1969

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 6785

with the ABM would be a crippling setback to the new President's professed quest for peace.

ABM WOULD SHIELD NOTHING, DETER NOBODY

Had any department of our government, except the Pentagon, come before Congress asking for an initial expenditure of \$7-\$9 billion for any program supported by so little in the way of hard evidence, logic, or common sense as has the proposed ABM system, that department would have undoubtedly been laughed off Capitol Hill.

But the Defense Department is so used to having its way with Congress that normally no revelations of waste and inefficiency, no evidence of misjudgement, no showing of egregious error is able to withstand its crunch. In a very real sense, the Pentagon has come to regard itself as what the New York Times recently called "a kind of military W.P.A. which requires ever-expanding appropriations, regardless of the world situation."

The proposed "Safeguard" antiballistic missile system may happily prove an exception to the general rule of Congressional spinelessness with respect to these appropriations. At last count, a slender majority of those U.S. senators who have committed themselves one way or the other oppose funding the program. Both of Alaska's senators are officially uncommitted. We hope they will vote "nay."

Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, who has carried the ball for the Nixon administration on ABM proposals to spend about \$9 billion to protect two of our 11 offensive missile sites, the logic being that an enemy will know that our retaliatory capabilities are invulnerable for the foreseeable future, and will thereby refrain from attacking us. He has marshalled a series of unconvincing and, in certain respects, self-contradictory arguments to support his position:

Argument No. 1: The Soviet Union has upset the nuclear balance of power by deploying its own ABM system around Moscow, and proceeding with the development of large numbers of offensive missiles which will be difficult to detect.

Answer: The thin ABM system around Moscow is already regarded as obsolete by all U.S. experts. There are no known Soviet plans to extend this system to other areas or to ring its own offensive sites with ABMs. The offensive missiles now being developed by the Soviet Union are no threat to our bombers, some of which are always airborne, or our Polaris-equipped submarine fleet, which together with our missile sites, maintain our needed retaliatory capabilities.

Argument No. 2: Scientific opinion is "divided" on this matter, so why take chances?

Answer: Except for those scientists in the full-time employ of the Defense Department, scientific opinion in this country is hardly divided at all. It is virtually unanimously against the Laird position. In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Laird was asked whether he had found any reputable scientists in the country to support his position. He mentioned two by name. It turned out he had chatted with one at an airport for a few minutes and had not contacted the other at all. Both opposed the Safeguard system.

Argument No. 3: There is "serious question" whether the Polaris system will be effective in the years to come. There are some things "the Soviets might do" indicated that satellites will never be able to detect submerged subs.

Answer: This is simply another bogeyman of fear spawned by Laird and his Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard in their recent Senate testimony.

Rear Adm. Levering Smith is director of the Navy's strategic systems projects. In a recent interview with the New Bedford (Mass.) Standard Times, he said he was

"quite positive" that neither the present nor the next generation of Soviet submarines would be able to track submerged Polaris subs. He said the Navy is unaware of any new Soviet anti-submarine devices and that satellites will never be able to detect submerged subs.

Argument No. 4: The Safeguard system will be able to knock down a missile launched "by accident," and it will also be able to cope with the threat from Communist China for years to come.

Answer: Only two offensive sites will be protected from an accidental launch. The greatest danger from any such accident is not to our offensive capacity, since this will not be appreciably impaired by a single errant missile. The danger instead is to a given population center, which the Safeguard system will not protect.

Communist China is probably a generation or so behind the Russians in missile capability. Since there is no conceivable way the Soviets can threaten our retaliatory forces over the next several decades, it defies logic to insist that the Chinese will be able to do so.

It is crucial to remember that we are presently talking about a skeleton project. Loose talk about protecting our population centers or all offensive sights is talk that envisions appropriations of at least \$30 billion. And by the time that electronic Maginot Line was complete, there would undoubtedly be talk of new billions to build new systems to meet new challenges.

We return to where we began. The proposed Safeguard system is a freak, even when placed in the company of several previous Pentagon monsters. The idea was conceived in error, has been perpetuated through self-deception, and is being peddled by thinly veiled appeals to terror and ignorance. It protects nothing and deters no one.

It closes no defense gap, missile or otherwise. The only gap it does affect is the credibility gap, and that it widens substantially. We're against it.

[From the St. Petersburg Times, Mar. 15, 1969]

ABM: THE PRESIDENT MAKES A TRAGIC DECISION

The worst fears of many Americans have been realized. President Richard Nixon has decided to deploy a \$7-billion anti-missile defense system.

This decision will erode American security by:

Escalating the arms competition with the Soviet Union, which now may build more and better attack missiles or expand its small anti-missile defense around Moscow.

Diminishing the prospects for meaningful negotiations with the Soviet Union—a nation that Nixon acknowledges has been traditionally defense-oriented, not attack-minded.

Committing crucial American economic resources to new military hardware when the crisis of unmet domestic needs threatens internal security.

Compromising presidential control over nuclear decision-making by permitting a technically uncertain ABM system to work automatically in a sudden crisis.

Prejudicing the movement toward international arms control which began with the nuclear test ban treaty and continued with the nuclear non-proliferation pact approved this week.

But most important of all, Nixon's decision jams the rudder of American defense policy and turns it in a different direction.

Taken to its ultimate extension, an examination of defense theories in the nuclear age reveals this truth: The only credible defense is the ability to absorb a surprise nuclear attack and then mount a counter-attack that destroys the enemy utterly.

We possess that capability now. It has been our defense against Soviet attack during the entire nuclear missile era.

The last two secretaries of defense considered deployment of ABM to protect missile and bomber bases. Both rejected the idea firmly. Other, simpler, surer options are open, involving improvement of second-strike capability.

If that capability has been a credible defense against the sophisticated Soviet nuclear threat, why wouldn't it be fully credible against the primitive nuclear force that Red China can assemble in the next 10 years? The answer is that it would be.

And yet Nixon claimed his ABM system would be aimed at the Red Chinese threat in the next decade.

Sen. Richard Russell, D-Ga., put it succinctly: "The Chinese are not completely crazy. They are not going to attack us with four or five missiles when they know we have the capability of virtually destroying their entire country."

Nixon promises periodic "re-examination" of his system. But "re-examination" is nothing more than an escalator clause that provides an easy way to expand this thin system into a bigger, more expensive deployment. The Nixon system is only a beginning.

It was the first major decision of the Nixon Administration, and it was a tragic one. Only the good sense of congressional opponents can salvage reason in this historic debate.

NIXON SEEKS PROGRAM WHICH COULD TRIGGER HUGE U.S.-U.S.S.R. ARMS RACE

Gratification over Senate passage of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty by 83 to 15 is diluted by President Richard M. Nixon's approval of a start on an antiballistic missile defense system aimed both at Russia and Red China. The treaty was in the bag and its approval was delayed only because Nixon chose not to take a position on it during the presidential campaign.

This treaty is important, of course, since the nations which now possess the bomb are more knowledgeable in the danger they pose and are less likely to employ them in a demonic moment.

Far more significant, however, is Nixon's skillfully contrived proposal for the ABM. Aware of the mounting resentment in the United States Senate against the Sentinel system and the whole massive military budget, Nixon made much of the fact he is seeking appropriations for only about half of the estimated \$6 billion cost of the thin line system.

What is important here is that if Nixon's conception of the system as one aimed at defense against Russia as well as Red China is accepted, the door is opened for a major arms race between the two super powers.

With every new missile development in Russia the administration can return to Congress to get money to expand the system until it might amount to \$100 billion and still offer no guarantee of adequate defense.

Many senators are properly incensed by what they deem to be the duping to which they have been exposed by the Pentagon. They still are not satisfied with the explanation offered for the Gulf of Tonkin and other incidents.

Certainly they know the Sentinel system was introduced in a sneaky way as solely aimed at Red China. Shortly the truth emerged and Nixon has now given it official sanction. It relates to both Russia and Peking.

Already some \$3 billion has been spent on research for the antiballistic defense line. The additional \$3 billion or \$4 billion Nixon says he will seek would accomplish little toward missile defense, so it has to be a foot in the door.

June 19, 1969

The American public and many senators and representatives are sick of riding the Pentagon merry-go-round.

Who is so gullible as to suppose Russia will accommodate the United States by maintaining the kinds of weaponry which can be shot down from a well-publicized Maginot line? The proposed ABM system at best could result only in a struggle to keep even, with the result that after spending billions the United States and Moscow would wind up at the same level of standoff.

Nixon's proposal for the ABM offsets the good news of the Senate passing of the non-proliferation treaty.

[From the Miami Herald, Mar. 23, 1969]

POLARIS MISSILE FORCE MUST NOT BE SLIGHTED

Lost in the mumbo jumbo of Defense Secretary Laird's testimony on the proposed anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system before the Senate was a statement which throws a shadow over the nation's major nuclear deterrent—the Polaris submarine force.

No weapon would seem more potent than these swift undersea craft capable of cruising great distances at considerable depths and in secret. They are known to mount 656 missiles. When these nuclear-propelled vessels are fully equipped with the superior Poseidon missile, they will be able to reach any target in strength from a distance of 3,500 nautical miles.

Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara favored deployment of the Poseidon submarine missile as an answer to a Soviet antimissile system. This would be far less costly and probably far more effective than the proposed \$25 billion Nike-X antimissile system, abandoned in favor of the cheaper "thin" Sentinel coverage.

The Sentinel, it ought to be pointed out again, defends only land-based missile sites. In other words, the defense is of a deterrent, and not targets such as cities and factories.

Years ago, after Hiroshima, it was pointed out to the satisfaction of many Americans, that there is no complete defense against nuclear attack. The Pentagon still talks in terms of 40 million dead in the first enemy strike. But the nearest things to a defense is an effective submarine ballistic system.

Lost, as we were saying, in Sec. Laird's testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee was the gloomy report that because of "new things that have taken place" the Polaris fleet probably would not remain "very free from attack" after 1972. An aide explained that the Soviet Union would have parity in the number of submarine-based missiles by 1974.

The only real defense against nuclear destruction is a political understanding that nuclear weapons will not be used. The next best answer, to repeat ourselves, is the established Polaris-Poseidon system. If this system is in jeopardy, the Senate will want to find out why, and how it can be strengthened.

The problem is not the Pentagon's ABM boondoggle, but a very real and potent defensive force already in being. Is it being slighted?

[From the Lewiston (Idaho) Tribune, Apr. 4, 1969]

A CYCLE OF MADNESS THAT MUST HAVE AN END

Listening to Defense Secretary Melvin Laird describe to his Senate audience the virtues of bigger, better ABMs, we got the feeling that it was a performance needing a psychedelic backdrop of swirling colors and lights, revolving patterns and words that recede and zoom and melt into other words with other meanings. It needed sound and beat and lightning flashes, for it was a performance designed not to inform but to excite, not to convince but to bedazzle.

There is little to be gained from a point-by-point argument over Mr. Laird's partic-

ulars, for what he offers is not fact but a premise, the premise that the evil men of the world are arrayed against us, and that we must move now to defend ourselves against anything they may do at any time in the future. It is to this thesis that we must now address ourselves, not to any orderly discussion of whether or not ABMs will work or whether or not we need them. It is an argument based not on logical discussion but emotional appeal, and it deserves the emotional response of outraged protest.

Mr. Laird admits, as did President Nixon before him, that there is no evidence that either Russia or China desires or is planning an attack on us. But because it is possible that they may, we must prepare against it. He admits that the ABM, no matter how ruinously expensive, will not protect us against a missile attack; but we must build it because we don't know anything better to do. And by implication we must build also every new weapon that is devised, not because it is needed, not because it will work, but because if we don't someone may take it as a sign of weakness and attack, or an attack will succeed that otherwise might have failed. . . .

We are being offered a world in which words lose their meaning. Only months ago we were being told that the ABM was absolutely vital for the protection of our cities; the same men now say that ABMs can't protect the cities and aren't needed for that purpose anyhow. Months ago these men were telling us that the missile sites for which we were spending billions were invulnerable to attack; now we are told we must have ABMs to protect these same sites from attack by other missiles. Only days ago Mr. Nixon assured us that only a few ABMs were needed because recent Russian history showed a nation primarily concerned with defense; now Mr. Laird warns that we cannot neglect any aspect of defense lest the Russians spring for our throat.

We are being offered a world in which spending for death leaves nothing to spend for life, in which our cities rot and our waters reek and our people groan from the burden of taxes, while we build more stately mansions underground from which to kill other men, frightened and frightening as ourselves. This is the cycle of madness, and somewhere, somehow, it must have an end.—The Louisville Courier-Journal & Times.

From the San Francisco Chronicle, Apr. 27, 1969]

THE TIME IS NOW

Senator John Sherman Cooper (Rep.-Ky.) has enlivened the Safeguard debate with a suggestion that President Nixon defer his proposed limited deployment of the anti-ballistic missile system pending discussions with the Soviet Union toward a disarmament agreement.

The suggestion had scarcely been uttered before its wisdom was reinforced by a curious coincidence in which the Nixon Administration, in Washington, and the Soviet Union, in the 17-nation disarmament talks at Geneva, put forward remarkably similar views on how such an agreement should be approached.

Washington spoke of a series of separate accords on limiting various weapons systems—one for submarine-fired missiles, another for land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, another for anti-ballistic missile systems, and so on. The Soviets' chief delegate at Geneva said that Moscow has abandoned its early one-package plan and now favors a phasing-out approach—first a prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons, then a limitation of delivery systems, then a prohibition against bomber flights outside of national borders, and so.

That program, he informed the delegates,

was specifically designed "to limit and exclude completely the possibility of a nuclear attack by one country against another" and "to promote an international atmosphere favorable to further disarmament negotiations."

U.S. officials are reported to have sniffed at the proposal as "nothing new" and to have pointed out the absence of any reference whatever to U.S. demands for on-site inspection to guarantee compliance. But the similarity of the Moscow and Washington positions is unmistakable—and the inspection issue may have become moot through development of reconnaissance by satellites. Senator Aiken of Vermont may have exaggerated somewhat in asserting that the system can "detect a postage stamp from 50 miles up," but its effectiveness was revealed by President Nixon himself when in his March 14 press conference he gave specific information that Moscow is ringed about with 67 ABMs.

Thus there is ample support for the optimistic appraisal that the time was never so propitious for disarmament talks, or so favorable toward the arguments of Senator Cooper, and other opponents of Safeguard, that postponement of any deployment would not only save billions but would head off a ruinous escalation of the arms race.

Supporters of Safeguard have apparently reached a similar conclusion. They have suddenly intensified a scare campaign in which the Defense Department speaks ominously of the Soviet Union's "first-strike capability" and Senator Strom Thurmond speaks fearfully of a "missile gap" in which he says the Soviets have more ICBMs than we have and—revealing that the gap is more anticipatory than real—"are catching up in all other areas of nuclear warfare."

[From the Riverside (Calif.) Enterprise, Mar. 27, 1969]

SUDDENLY, 8 FEET TALL

Defense Secretary Melvin Laird came out with some frightening testimony before a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee, testimony that raises more questions than it answers.

In justifying the President's anti-ballistic missile decision, Secretary Laird said that the Soviets have embarked upon a policy which could give them the power to destroy America's retaliatory strength.

The Secretary said that the Soviets are deploying nuclear blockbusters and building a more sophisticated submarine fleet. He concluded that their ambition is to achieve a first-strike capability, "no doubt about that."

When did this happen? If the Secretary's comments are correct, then there has been some amazing intelligence gathered in just the last eight weeks or a grave threat to the national security was allowed to occur.

Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright responded, "Suddenly the Russians are becoming eight feet tall and they are about to overwhelm us." That is not an entirely unreasonable observation, given what prompted it.

For, when did the Soviets decide on getting into position to knock out America's nuclear arm in one fell sweep? Is this, in fact, a new policy? Or is it something that has always been an ultimate goal, to be worked toward if not realized? Is the U.S. after a similar first-strike capability?

Secretary Laird has to understand that this is quite a bit to throw at people, that there are those who might take him literally and get the impression that the Russians are bent on doing in the United States next week.

Also, the Secretary's view is hard to adjust to the fact that he speaks for an Administration which claims to be basing its re-

June 19, 1969

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 6787

lations with the Soviets on negotiations, not confrontations.

Either someone is dramatizing the Soviet ambitions or this nation is in dire straits.

And, to think, only months ago the reason offered for an ABM thin-line was that it was insurance against the Chinese doing something crazy. Now, it's because the Russians are supposed to be intent upon changing the entire balance of power, maybe just by suddenly wiping out this country.

If the ABM line thickens at the rate the justifications for it have proliferated, then within a few years there's going to be a missile site in every other backyard.

[From the Sacramento (Calif.) Bee,
Apr. 16, 1969]

ANOTHER VIEWPOINT: THE VERSATILE ABM

One of the marvels of the ABM is the facility with which proponents of the system switch their rationalizations for it. When he appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary of Defense Laird preached the gospel of ABM as an indispensable defense against Soviet nuclear power. When he appeared before the Foreign Relations disarmament subcommittee, he painted it as a "building block" toward disarmament. We must deploy the system, he seemed to be saying, in order to be in a position to agree not to deploy it.

The same flexibility, if that is what it should be called, has been exhibited by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For years the JCS has been insisting that the national security demanded missile defense for at least 25 major cities. The "thin" system adopted by the Johnson administration was regarded by the joint chiefs as only a stepping stone toward a thick, system covering the population centers.

Yet when the Nixon administration decided that the population cannot be protected and that the ABM should be deployed around Minuteman missile sites instead, the joint chiefs abandoned their position and embraced the new rationalization.

How much value is to be attached to a solemn determination of "security" needs by the military mandarins when it can be so readily alerted to fit the political needs of a new administration?

What made the Johnson version of the Sentinel system untenable, and caused work on it to be suspended, was not a military but a political fact—namely, the exploding opposition of suburbanites who did not want ABMs in their back yards. This was a blow to the Pentagon, whose public opinion engineers had expected the location of ABMs near some cities to produce irresistible demands for their location around all cities.

When the people displayed more common sense than they had been credited with, a new rationalization had to be hastily put together. The specter of a mad Chinese launching a missile attack on the cities had to be laid aside, and the old, reliable specter of a Russian assault on American civilization revived for one more run around the track.

When so many conflicting reasons can be advanced for an escalation of the nuclear arms race, that is cause enough to be skeptical of all of them.

[From the Riverside (Calif.) Enterprise, Mar. 24, 1969]

DOWN, NOT UP

The Senate Armed Services Committee has made itself a televised forum for witnesses who support President Nixon's plea to deploy a modified system of anti-ballistic missiles.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is giving a televised forum to witnesses who oppose it. When the Senate decides whether or not to appropriate funds for the first two planned ABM sites, it will have to resolve this clash between two of its own committees.

Armed Services, with its generally hawk-

ish bias on Vietnam and most other issues, is charged with the relatively narrow task of preserving America's military security. Foreign Relations has to deal with all the broader aspects of national security; armaments and strategic dispositions are a part, but only a part of the larger picture.

Buttressing the case for the ABMs, Defense Department witnesses painted for Armed Service committeemen an alarming picture of the Soviet missile buildup. Witnesses even were permitted—encouraged might be a better word—to reach back into the security stockroom and bring out material hitherto stamped secret. This, after all, is the Pentagon's big push.

Perhaps the Soviet buildup is as alarming as was depicted. But that is not the same as establishing that the best way to keep the country, and world, from destroying itself, is to embark on an intensified American buildup.

Somewhere, if armament races never stop, somebody is bound to throw a match and the stockpile will blow up. Who's safe, what country has a chance of "winning" once nuclear warheads are flying?

If the Soviets are getting near to a position of dangerous superiority, or even omniscient first-strike capability, the obvious first U.S. effort should be to explore fully the prospects of negotiating the arms race down rather than jockeying it up.

And particularly at this time when the Soviets sound more interested in arms talks than they have for many years, and when they are pressed from behind by a belligerent Red China.

[From the St. Petersburg, (Fla.) Times,
Apr. 7, 1969]

NIXON'S ABM: COLD WAR OF ANOTHER KIND

The Senate Foreign Relations Disarmament Subcommittee has stripped the fiction from President Nixon's anti-ballistic missile proposal. The Sentinel-turned-Safeguard stands naked of any validity and shivering in the cold blasts of truth leveled at it by the subcommittee.

The two most chilling indications that Nixon's ABM is a high-yield boondoggle came from Administration spokesmen themselves.

Secretary of State William Rogers told the subcommittee the Administration would "have no problem," in fact would "be delighted," to put the American ABM proposal on ice if the Soviet Union would dismantle its small ABM system around Moscow.

If that is so—and there is every reason to hope it is—then Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird was misleading the American people when he said this system is necessary to protect against the Soviet "offensive" threat that might develop in the mid-1970s.

If the American ABM can be traded for its Soviet counterpart, then it has nothing to do with an alleged Soviet intent to build an offense so strong it could overwhelm the American ability to counterattack. It has nothing to do with new intelligence alleged to indicate such an intent. It has nothing to do with changes in the Soviet SS-9 missile.

As for its other potential uses:

Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard himself dismissed the Chinese threat as "not much further along than it was three years ago."

Protection against an accidental launch would be limited immediately to two Minuteman sites in the upper Midwest, and the urban centers of North Dakota and Montana, according to Administration presentations.

But there is an even more disturbing indication that the Administration is misleading the American people. Pressed to produce the list of non-Pentagon scientists he promised—a list supposed to offer names of independent

experts who served as advisers on ABM—Packard produced only one name: Dr. Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, a Stanford physicist.

Panofsky was called before the subcommittee, where he immediately set the record straight. His service as adviser was limited to a chance meeting with Packard in the San Francisco airport. He said, "I would like to state that I did not participate in any advisory capacity to any branch of the government in reviewing the decision to deploy the current modified Sentinel or Safeguard system."

Every credible indication is that ABM is unnecessary, fabulously expensive, diplomatically disruptive, strategically provocative and technically uncertain.

But what makes the blood run cold is that the Administration apparently is willing to mislead the American people to justify the ABM.

[From the Hackensack (N.J.) Record,
Mar. 31, 1969]

REASONS FOR ANGER

The sheer horror of the national debate over the antiballistic missile—here we soberly discuss the instantaneous slaughter of scores of millions of human beings as if it were a problem in mathematics—is mitigated by the intensity of the opposition.

It is critically important that the tradition of giving the Pentagon its own way be challenged—challenged vehemently. The United States has already gone altogether too far in the direction of militarism. The New Yorker magazine quotes George Wald of Harvard, the Nobel laureate in biology, on the subject:

"How many of you realize that just before World War II the entire American Army, including the Air Corps numbered 139,000 men? ... Now we have 3½ million men under arms: about 600,000 in Vietnam, about 300,000 more in support areas elsewhere in the Pacific, about 250,000 in Germany. And there are a lot more at home. Some months ago we were told that 30,000 National Guardsmen and 200,000 Reservists—so half a million men—had been trained for riot duties in the cities."

And last Monday in the Senate Sen. Stephen M. Young, D-Ohio, termed the United States the world's largest military-industrial complex. He continued:

"Ten per cent of the American labor force is involved in either military or defense-related employment. Approximately 22,000 of our largest manufacturing corporations are prime military contractors, while more than 100,000 firms contribute to some type of output to defense production."

"The United States is the world's largest exporter of munitions. Our annual expenditures for defense purposes, so called, far exceed the total amount spent for welfare, education and poverty programs."

And as Sen. Young said, the pressure now is building for vastly increasing military spending in the United States, the instant project being the \$6-billion ABM system that no one can believe will remain within that estimate.

It is time for serious, thoroughgoing debate, not only concerning the ABM proposal but concerning the direction the country is to take. There is no question that the United States and the Soviet Union have right now the capacity to destroy each other and much of the rest of the world. And there should be no question that this country, with its enlightened traditions, should be leading the world into paths far from militarism.

The militarism we now have came out of World War II and a long series of crises that built one on another until we got to where we are. It is not necessary any one's especial fault. It need not commit the nation to a course of lavishing its brains and its resources on machinery of death and destruc-

June 19, 1969.

tion. Let the debate in the Senate—and in the country at large—be thorough, candid, and if necessary angry. We are under no compulsion to drift to disaster.

[From the Jamestown (N.Y.) Post-Journal, Mar. 27, 1969]

POWER OF THE MILITARY

There have been several shocking exposes recently in the nation's press pointing up the validity of the warning issued by former President Dwight Eisenhower some years ago when he cautioned Americans to beware of the industrial-military complex in this country.

The Washington Post has turned up "classified" documents detailing the massive propaganda campaign carried on by the Defense Department last year which it used in persuading Congress to appropriate initial funds for the controversial Sentinel Antiballistic Missile System.

Here is how the Defense Department operates as disclosed by the Washington Post: The Pentagon organizes favorably disposed scientists to manufacture magazine articles supporting the Sentinel system; senators and congressmen are given classified briefings by "high officials"; industrial firms and civilian contractors riding on the Sentinel gravy train are mobilized to generate public opinion in favor of same; leading citizens in "impacted" communities are communicated with; transportable display exhibits, pre-taped voice commentaries, "information packets," visual aids and mockups are employed to spread the word that if only the nation will go on spending billions for ABM's, maybe casualties in a nuclear exchange can be cut from 100 million to 40 million. The campaign worked last year and it is expected it will have its impact again this year despite mounting opposition to the ABM system in Congress.

When Washington Post uncovered the Defense Department's "public information" apparatus the Pentagon responded by saying that it was "standard procedure" and couldn't understand why anyone would get excited. Using the taxpayers' money to commit the taxpayers to vast new military expenditures has become so routine that the Defense Department doesn't care if the public knows about it or not.

One of the latest pieces of evidence pointing up the power of the military-industrial complex came in the revelation that the Department of the Army involved itself in an apparent conspiracy with defense contractors to propagandize in behalf of the Sentinel system.

Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor's hand was caught in this operation, in which the Army planned to conspire with defense contractors to "plant" articles favorable to the Sentinel in the nation's press.

We can be sure that once the ABM system has been deployed the Pentagon's propaganda machine will be busy again this time pushing for the development of an expensive decoy missile system and the packaging of greater destructive megatonnage in the missile warheads. That is the next step! It will be argued that an aggressor can afford to saturate a target with ten or more decoys to one armed missile, activating the ABM defense and causing it to expend most of its explosive payloads on unarmed attackers.

And the decoy system is not the end of the line either. Next we shall hear how the Soviet Union is going underground with all of its major industrial and defense facilities, its utilities and its key government bureau. Of course the U.S. will have to match this effort and one can imagine the billions and billions of dollars yet to be expended for this ever escalating arms race and military strategy.

Those who argue in favor of President Nixon's proposed modified ABM system saying that because it is of a defensive nature there

is no threat to stimulating the arms race simply are ignorant of the facts of life as they are viewed and plotted by the military-industrial complex. They apparently are not aware that the decoy system comes next, followed by higher explosive payloads and eventually a movement of major facilities underground. But this is the way it is and the American people seem to be at the mercy of those powerful forces which propagandize the nation into submission at the taxpayer's expense.

ABM—VITAL TO DEFENSE

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President. It is extremely difficult for many Americans and this Senator to understand those who have traditionally opposed the defense of our Nation—those, who today amidst a cloud of technical misinformation tell us it is wrong to provide for our national security in the 1970's. They have given the national debate on the Safeguard ABM as requested by President Nixon a very curious twist. Suddenly, it is wrong, they say, to devise and to maintain a force which will help prevent nuclear war; and to do so in a way which would not tend to quicken the much talked about arms race, but would merely defend and protect our military capability and make an attack less likely.

Much has been said as well about that "dreadful military-industrial complex" and its alleged outlandish profiteering. It is time to set the record straight on that score, too. Over the past 8 years, nearly every major defense and technologically oriented manufacturer in California has faced a reduction in sales, profits, and most important, in employment. Several have suffered the agonies of layoffs in the thousands. And there are few industries whose profits are controlled by law and Executive order like those of which I speak. It should be well noted that a 3-percent net profit is regarded as outstanding by executives in this field.

Mr. President, our late beloved General Eisenhower has been quoted by many from his farewell speech as he left the Presidency.

It is again high time to set the record straight—to quote from the meat and intent of his remarks. President Eisenhower's main thrust was toward our national security, with the assurance that at that time we had the national strength of character to bear the burdens of a prolonged and complex struggle, against any who might wish to destroy us.

In context, President Eisenhower said, and I quote:

A vital element in keeping the peace is our Military Establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction.

He continued:

We face a hostile ideology—global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose, and insidious in method. Unhappily, the danger it poses promises to be of indefinite duration. To meet it successfully, there is called for, not so much the emotional and transitory sacrifices of crisis, but rather those which will enable us to carry forward steadily, surely, and without complaint the burdens of a prolonged and complex struggle—with liberty the stake.

In other words, then as now, we cannot progress in the fight to achieve a better life for all Americans unless we are free to operate within a framework of security and safety which can be provided only by our great military and technical strength—not to make war, but to guarantee peace.

It is most difficult to understand how those who oppose the Safeguard ABM ever got so far afield from the words of Eisenhower—how they would have us gamble on our security.

Mr. President, the issue is simple: Faced with a rapidly growing Soviet nuclear force, which has now surpassed ours in number of land-based ICBM's in being and under construction; and the very real potential of a Chinese Communist nuclear armed ICBM, what are the most prudent actions to take?

An immediate answer might be—disarm. But even the most ardent advocate of disarmament surely would not seriously propose unilateral disarmament in the face of the present example of Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia and their consistently expanding nuclear armament. Should we hold arms limitation talks in missiles, bombers, and submarines, then? Most certainly. But, we must deal realistically with this most important situation. I fully hope discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union on arms limitation will proceed and possibly be completed before the first Safeguard site becomes operational. And, it seems clear the Safeguard not only will not interfere with such talks but, in the face of the potential Chinese Communist threat which must be considered by both the Soviet Union and the United States, the existence of a light defense may well make it easier for us to agree with the Russians on an arms limitation proposal. But arms limitation talks are, after all, only talks. It takes two sides to agree; meaningful agreement may be very difficult to attain and may take years. We are, as yet, uncertain concerning Soviet strategic motives, and there is sufficient evidence to prove the U.S.S.R. has, in fact, quickened her arms production. What then is prudent while we proceed with arms limitation discussions?

What are our goals? They are: First, to prevent nuclear war by insuring that any possible adversary recognizes the certainty of our deterrent capability; second, to do all that we can to slow the arms race, while at the same time making certain of our defense. In considering these goals, let me place the issue in its proper context. The Soviet nuclear force buildup is a reality—now. The Soviet ICBM force is there—now. It is at least equal to our ICBM force—now. That Soviet force is rapidly expanding—now. The Soviet Polaris-like submarine is being produced in great numbers—now. The Soviet Union has an ABM defense of a wide area surrounding Moscow—now. The proposed Safeguard system, if approved, would not be operational for another 4½ years.

Consider our first goal: To prevent nuclear war by insuring that any possible adversary recognizes the certainty of our deterrent capability, and therefore

June 19, 1969

the utter futility of initiating nuclear war.

The possibility of the continued growth of Soviet nuclear forces to a point where a response on our part was required has been recognized for several years. The most recent review of that situation has convinced the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President that a response to preserve our deterrent strength must be initiated now. This review considered the Soviet threat that exists now, the time involved in our making an adequate response, and uncertainties in Soviet intentions. The response proposed is Safeguard. Phase 1 of the Safeguard deployment is a light defense of part of our Minuteman land-based ICBM force. In the annual reviews of the program promised by the President, subsequent actions of the Soviet Union and the status of the arms limitation talks will be carefully considered in determining which, if any, of the options available in phase 2 of the deployment it is appropriate to undertake. In my opinion, this light defense of our Minuteman ICBM's is a prudent step toward maintaining the adequacy of our deterrent. With annual reviews it will remain responsive to changes, up or down, in the Soviet offensive forces.

Safeguard clearly tells the Soviet Union that faced with the growing threat to the survival of our deterrent force, had we elected to increase the number of our deterrent weapons, our action could have been misconstrued as a threat to their nation. Safeguard, however, does not threaten the Soviet Union. And—the Soviet leaders know that. I repeat—the Soviet leaders know that. While meeting our second goal—it will not incite a Soviet reaction and thus add to the arms race nor will it in any way hinder the initiation of arms limitation talks. The Safeguard program has as one of its possible future alternatives a thin defense against attacks anywhere in the country. This is not part of the first phase of Safeguard and would be undertaken only if future developments prove it to be necessary. We do not know how to defend our cities against massive attacks such as the Soviet Union could launch, except by letting them know that we have the capability of retaliating with unacceptable destruction. We could protect them against light attacks which would be the best Communist China might do for some years. It is not necessary nor is it being proposed to make the decision now to deploy such a nationwide defense. That will be decided only when necessary.

Then, it is necessary to set the record straight on another important factor—cost. The American people have been confused and alarmed by the figures quoted by some of those who oppose the ABM. They would have us believe the President intends to open the money hydrant to pour some \$30 billion, or even a hundred billion dollars into a program before the first phase of research and development is started. That, Mr. President, simply is not the truth. I submit there is a question of propriety in such rhetoric and when our

citizens are already overtaxed, it is indeed cruel to raise the specter of an impossible financial burden in order to deny the President the Safeguard he needs. The President has asked for only \$392 million to proceed with the initial steps toward deployment of Safeguard. This is less than the usual request for major programs and is a small price to pay for a step toward the continued security of our people.

Mr. President, if I may borrow from the vernacular of our youth, it is time to tell it like it is. Safeguard is simply a minimum prudent step to protect our deterrent capability in the face of a large and growing Soviet offensive nuclear strike capability. It is a step which will not quicken the arms race; it is a step which does not hinder arms limitation talks; it is a step which goes only so far as is required by the growth in the Soviet force; it is a step which is subject to annual review by the President and the Congress; and it is a step which must be taken now if we are to have any defense 5 years from now. It is a step which, I believe, the security of this Nation demands that we take.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, is there further morning business?

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1969

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the unfinished business be laid before the Senate.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will be stated by title.

The ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R. 11400) making supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969, and for other purposes.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

There being no objection, the Senate resumed the consideration of the bill.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, what is the pending question?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The pending question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS).

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AMERICAN CASUALTIES IN VIETNAM

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, the Defense Department reports that for the week ending June 14, 335 American soldiers

were killed in Vietnam and 1,695 were wounded.

This brings the total number of such casualties to more than 42,000 which have suffered in Vietnam since the inauguration of President Nixon.

Mr. President, this war must end. It must end because it is immoral and because it is wrong.

It must end too, because it threatens to destroy us.

I hope that the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations will consider convening the committee in public session in order to examine the question: What is the road to peace, and what policy, what action, would constitute a step toward peace, an appropriate policy for peace?

This, it seems to me, is the fundamental policy decision before our country today. We have been diverted from this principal issue by the attention focused upon the proposal to withdraw some 25,000 American soldiers from South Vietnam.

The key policy issue is whether the United States shall seek, and whether we will use our pervasive presence in South Vietnam to persuade a peaceful settlement through conciliation of the forces and factions in South Vietnam, or whether we shall persist in supporting and maintaining in power the repressive Thieu-Ky regime.

Now that President Nixon has "ruled out" a military victory, the political process seems an appropriate, if not the only, procedure for peace. What procedure or policy would be most appropriate?

This deserves and requires our attention.

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1969

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 11400) making supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969, and for other purposes.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be dispensed with.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may yield to the Senator from Virginia (Mr. Spong) for the purpose of considering his amendment, and that consideration of my amendment shall follow immediately upon the disposition of the amendment of the Senator from Virginia.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AMENDMENT NO. 47

Mr. SPONG. Mr. President, I call up my amendment No. 47 and ask that it be stated.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The amendment will be stated.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

On page 17, line 11, strike out "\$19,920,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$20,280,000".

On page 18, line 6, after "grants," insert the following: "\$360,000 which shall remain available until expended and shall be considered as interest earned on the sum authorized to be appropriated by section 108(b) of the District of Columbia Public Education Act, as amended (D.C. Code, sec. 31-1608) and shall not be considered as an amount appropriated under such section."

Mr. SPONG. Mr. President, first, let me thank the distinguished Senator from New York for yielding to me at this time.

On yesterday, I filed a complete statement on this amendment along with certain correspondence pertinent to it.

Additionally I would only say to the Senate that this amendment appropriates, in lieu of land-grant-endowment appropriation for the District of Columbia, a sum equivalent to the income on such an endowment. This will enable the extension work in nutrition education, homemaking, consumer and adult education in the District of Columbia to be tripled in the next year. The fate of the endowment fund, which has passed the House, will be determined in conference. Regardless of what the conference decides, this type of extension education is badly needed at this time in the District.

I have discussed this with the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. BYRD) and others on the committee, and I would be pleased at this time to hear from the Senator from West Virginia with regard to it.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Virginia has discussed this matter with me and I have discussed it with the ranking minority member on the subcommittee. I think the Senator from Virginia (Mr. SPONG) has made a fine presentation which has reflected a great deal of research and work on his part. I commend him for it. The ranking minority member and I have agreed to accept this amendment and go to conference with it.

Mr. SPONG. I thank the able Senator from West Virginia.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Virginia.

The amendment to the committee amendment was agreed to.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question now recurs on the amendment of the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) (No. 40).

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I think that I shall go ahead, as some of the points with respect to this amendment are incorporated in a letter which every Member of the Senate has received, and deal with the basic problem.

Mr. President, the problem really involved here is the very deeply rooted one of reallocation of priorities in our country. I seek to reallocate an amount of \$55 million, which is no great sum of money, considering the problems and the extent of our budgetary expenditures. Nonetheless, it is a significant example of what people like myself, deeply concerned with our big cities, as well as our smaller cities, and with what is happening to them, have been bringing up before the Congress.

Here we are, coming into the summer, with more than 1,500,000 young boys and girls, below the poverty line, 14 to 21 years of age, out of school; the question is, What is going to happen to them this summer? This question is complicated, of course, by unforeseen events which could take place. But we already know we have faced a condition of concern and disruption not only in colleges and universities, but in high schools as well, and hence we probably do not face a tranquil national situation.

In addition, we are very cognizant of the fact that in the field of housing, health, and education, we have tremendous divisiveness and many dislocations in the country. I need only mention the terrible struggle, so bitter and deep, over school decentralization in my own city of New York; the fact that, for lack of money, whole school systems have been shut down in other parts of the country, indicates the incendiary material that is upon us. In addition, the measures which we have taken in the poverty program, the manpower training program, and so many other programs, have given some opportunity, but by no means enough opportunity, to make a dent in the mounting of poverty in the country. Hence, all of the combustible materials are there, and the outlook seems bleak.

The question is, What kind of summer are we going to have? I do not know, but I do know that I am certainly against asking for trouble or paying somebody off not to create it. I feel that when we have ongoing programs which have proved their worth, which are modest in cost, and which are a constructive contribution to the way in which citizens in the poverty classification can be helped, we certainly ought to do everything we can to enhance these programs to provide for the constructive utilization of the time of our Nation's youth. No one knows better than I—who have had a lifetime of experience with all of these programs—that you simply cannot force money into these operations the way you would force food into the throat of a Strasbourg goose. But there must be some capacity to use them effectively.

Hence, both the Department of Labor, which, by the deflegation of the Anti-poverty Office, handles this particular matter, and the committees, and others, have done their utmost to ascertain what is really needed as compared with what is available. The real issue between my committee and myself and those who are supporting me—and I will read the list of the cosponsors of this amendment—is: Shall we provide what the Department says can be used effectively, or shall we provide what the mayors of the country, who are right on the firing line, feel can be used effectively?

We must bear in mind that, no matter what we provide in the Senate—and I, have served on the Appropriations Committee, just as has the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. BYRD) and the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. CORTON), who are both in the Chamber—this matter will go to conference and some compromise will be hammered out. Or shall it be some figure in between?

Here are the bare bones of the factual situation: Last year there were, roughly speaking, 336,000 of these summer job slots. The reason why there were 336,000, and not something like 300,000, was that after an unbelievable struggle in the conference, with the tremendous aid of the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. BYRD), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. CORTON), and other members, it so happens that we got \$13 million more than the House originally allowed. So we had 336,000 slots.

The target population is 1,500,000 youths between 14 and 21 in the poverty category. The Department of Labor says that if you add 24,000 more slots to the 336,000 slots already provided—making a total of 360,000 slots—then that's making a total of all they think they can effectively use. That would require that the added appropriation which is contained in the committee amendment be \$10 million, instead of the \$7,500,000 provided.

I will say this to the members of the committee: The department has been moving on this matter. At one time, its figure was \$5.5 million additional. When the Appropriations Committee considered it, the amount was \$7.5 million. The last figure which we received, which was just the other day, June 17, moved the figure up to \$10 million.

I think it is a very significant approach to the question of a reallocation of priorities that the Department has been moving up its own figure as it has obtained more information.

The U.S. Conference of Mayors, which represents the mayors of 610 cities, happens to have been meeting in Pittsburgh this week. The conference feels that the cities need 136,500 slots. In fact, it adopted a resolution, which I agreed to report to the Senate, which was phoned in to me just yesterday, asking for \$100 million, not for the \$55 million which I have asked for, which is the appropriate translation of the 136,500 slots, at \$411 into \$55 million. They have asked for \$100 million, based upon what they consider to be their best information.

The \$55 million for 136,500 would stand in the place of the \$7½ million for 16,000 to 17,000 slots which the committee bill would add, and in place of the \$10 million for 24,000 slots which even the Department of Labor recommends. This number, 36,000 slots, is based on the actual survey of capability of use of the U.S. Conference of Mayors. It calls for 72,382 slots in the 50 largest cities in the country; and I put into the RECORD of last Monday a chart which analyzes that figure, and shows the additions required in each major city, so that Senators may identify and check our figures.

The 72,000 slots for the 50 major cities would cost roughly \$30 million. I am giving these various cost figures, because I think each of them is meaningful.

In the smaller cities of the country, the mayors estimate that some 67,000 slots are required. Now, because the data has been slow in coming in, we have only been able to get samplings from the various States. However, we do have a sampling of a smaller city from practi-